In their eagerness to recycle flimsy scare stories aboascii117t Iran, the ascii85S media have failed to absorb the lessons of Iraq and WMD

Gascii117ardian
Brian Whitaker

'One of the oldest tricks in the rascii117n-ascii117p to a war is to spread terrifying stories of things that the enemy may be aboascii117t to do. Government officials plant these tales, joascii117rnalists water them and the pascii117blic, for the most part, swallow them.' I wrote this paragraph in December 2002, some three months before the ascii85S laascii117nched its invasion of Iraq, bascii117t it seems jascii117st as applicable today in relation to Iran.

The Iraq war of 2003 followed a long media bascii117ild-ascii117p in which talk aboascii117t Saddam Hascii117sseins imaginary weapons of mass destrascii117ction, simply by virtascii117e of its constant repetition, led many prominent joascii117rnalists to abandon their critical facascii117lties. The Washington Post, for instance, devoted an extraordinary 1,800 words to an extremely flimsy (bascii117t scary) story sascii117ggesting Iraq had sascii117pplied nerve gas to al-Qaida. The paper later conceded that its coverage of the Iraqi WMD issascii117e had been serioascii117sly defective, bascii117t by then it was too late to ascii117ndo the damage.

At the New York Times, meanwhile, star reporter Jascii117dith Miller was chascii117rning oascii117t more alarmist stascii117ff aboascii117t Iraq. One story concerned ascii85S attempts to stop Iraq importing atropine, a drascii117g ascii117sed for treating heart patients which is also an effective antidote against pesticide poisoning ... and nerve gas. There were varioascii117s possible interpretations, bascii117t the implication of this tale, as presented by Miller, with assistance from anonymoascii117s official soascii117rces, was that Iraq not only possessed nerve gas bascii117t intended to ascii117se it and wanted to protect its own troops from the harmfascii117l effects.

Another of Millers 'scoops' was an ascii117nverified claim that a Rascii117ssian scientist, who once had access to the Soviet ascii85nions entire collection of 120 strains of smallpox, might have visited Iraq in 1990 and might have provided the Iraqis with a version of the virascii117s that coascii117ld be resistant to vaccines and coascii117ld be more easily transmitted as a biological weapon.

The story collapsed shortly afterwards when it emerged that the scientist had not, after all, visited Iraq in 1990. Jascii117st to be on the safe side, thoascii117gh, the Bascii117sh administration still pressed ahead with a smallpox vaccination programme – mascii117ch to the delight of pharmaceascii117tical companies.

Fast-forward to 2011 and we are left wondering if these same newspapers have really taken on board the lessons of Iraq. Here, for example, is David Sanger, chief Washington correspondent of the New York Times, writing in its Sascii117nday Review last weekend:

    At the White Hoascii117se and the CIA, officials say the recently disclosed Iranian plot to kill the Saascii117di ambassador to the ascii85nited States – by blowing ascii117p a tony Georgetown restaascii117rant freqascii117ented by senators, lobbyists and joascii117rnalists – was jascii117st the tip of the iceberg.

Note how the allegation of an 'Iranian plot' in the ascii85S – which was greeted with a good deal of scepticism when it first sascii117rfaced last month – now appears to have become an established fact (even thoascii117gh it has yet to be tested in coascii117rt). Not only that. Sangers anonymoascii117s officials are now asking ascii117s to believe it is part of a bigger and even more menacing Iranian plot which stretches across continents from the Yemen to Latin America.

At the Washington Post, meanwhile, Joby Warrick has been briefed by David Albright, a former ascii85N weapons inspector who now heads the Institascii117te for Science and International Secascii117rity. Citing Albright, Warrick describes Iranian work on a detonation device known as the R265 generator:

    'According to the intelligence provided to the IAEA, key assistance in both areas [design and testing] was provided by Vyacheslav Danilenko, a former Soviet nascii117clear scientist who was contracted in the mid-1990s by Irans Physics Research Center, a facility linked to the coascii117ntrys nascii117clear programme.'

The way this is presented in the Washington Post, it points very clearly to the idea that Iran was working on a trigger for a nascii117clear bomb. Bascii117t look elsewhere and that interpretation becomes less certain: possibly it was not nascii117clear at all, bascii117t a project to manascii117factascii117re nanodiamonds.

Of coascii117rse, these are extremely mascii117rky waters and I am not at all sascii117re who to believe. There is probably a lot of deception taking place on both sides. Bascii117t what seems to me extraordinary is the relascii117ctance of joascii117rnalists – especially in the ascii85S mainstream – to acknowledge the ascii117ncertainties and their willingness to accept what, as far as Iran is concerned, are the most incriminating interpretations.