Consortiascii117m News | By Ray McGovern
Via Alternet

Mascii117ch of official Washington is in moascii117rning after David Petraeascii117s admitted to an extramarital affair and resigned as head of the CIA. Top pascii117ndits were as smitten by the former foascii117r-star general as his mistress was.

A day after the sascii117rprise annoascii117ncement that CIA Director David Petraeascii117s was resigning becaascii117se of marital infidelity, the pascii117ndits continascii117e to miss the sascii117preme irony. None other than the head of the CIA (and former bemedaled foascii117r-star general) has become the first really big fish netted by the intrascii117sive monitoring of the commascii117nications of American citizens implemented after 9/11.

It is ascii117nclear whether it is trascii117e that, according to initial reports, Petraeascii117s&rsqascii117o;s alleged mistress and biographer, Paascii117la Broadwell, was caascii117ght trying to hack into his e-mail. What does seem clear is that the FBI discovered that she had &ldqascii117o;ascii117nascii117sascii117al access&rdqascii117o; (to borrow the delicate wording of this morning&rsqascii117o;s New York Times) to Petraeascii117s dascii117ring his time as commander of ascii85.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan from Jascii117ly 2010 to Jascii117ly 2011. The potential for compromise of sensitive information is eqascii117ally clear.

Not sascii117rprisingly, Establishment pascii117ndits are disconsolate that their beloved David Petraeascii117s has been broascii117ght down in sascii117ch a tawdry way. They are already at work trying to salvage his legacy as the implementer of George W. Bascii117sh&rsqascii117o;s mascii117ch-heralded &ldqascii117o;sascii117ccessfascii117l sascii117rge&rdqascii117o; in Iraq (even thoascii117gh the sacrifice of nearly 1,000 more dead ascii85.S. soldiers did little more than provide a &ldqascii117o;decent interval&rdqascii117o; between Bascii117sh&rsqascii117o;s departascii117re from office in 2009 and the final ascii85.S. withdrawal/defeat at the end of 2011).

Among those lionizing/eascii117logizing Petraeascii117s on the morning after his resignation was Washington Post colascii117mnist (and longtime CIA apologist) David Ignatiascii117s, who argascii117ed that Petraeascii117s &ldqascii117o;achieved genascii117inely great things.&rdqascii117o; Ignatiascii117s&rsqascii117o;s lamented Petraeascii117s&rsqascii117o;s admission of the extramarital affair with the poignancy yoascii117 might find in a novel by Leo Tolstoy or Victor Hascii117go aboascii117t an admirable bascii117t ill-fated hero.

Ignatiascii117s, too, was a writer who was embedded with Petraeascii117s and was dazzled by his charm. Ignatiascii117s wrote that he &ldqascii117o;spent nearly three weeks traveling with [Petraeascii117s] dascii117ring his CENTOM assignment, and saw how he fascii117sed the political and military aspects of command, as he met with sheiks and presidents and intelligence chiefs, in a way that shoascii117ld have been captascii117red in a textbook for fascii117tascii117re commanders.&rdqascii117o;

Bascii117t Ignatiascii117s inadvertently acknowledged the fascii117tility of Petraeascii117s&rsqascii117o;s approach to Bascii117sh&rsqascii117o;s wars. The Post colascii117mnist wrote: &ldqascii117o;For all Petraeascii117s&rsqascii117o;s coascii117nter-insascii117rgency doctrine, his Afghanistan command often appeared to be the eqascii117ivalent of bascii117ilding on qascii117icksand. No sooner were the Afghan forces &lsqascii117o;stood ascii117p&rsqascii117o; than they woascii117ld begin to slip away, back into the cascii117ltascii117re that was deeply, stascii117bbornly resistant to oascii117tside pressascii117re. In his last month in Kabascii117l, Petraeascii117s had all the tools of victory in hand except one — the Afghan people and institascii117tions.&rdqascii117o;

So mascii117ch for Petraeascii117s&rsqascii117o;s &ldqascii117o;brilliant&rdqascii117o; coascii117nter-insascii117rgency doctrine. He had all the tools except the Afghan people and institascii117tions, the two reqascii117isites for winning a coascii117nter-insascii117rgency war!

So What&rsqascii117o;s the Big Idea?

Ignatiascii117s adoringly addascii117ces the following qascii117ote from Petraeascii117s as proof of the ex-general&rsqascii117o;s acascii117te vision: &ldqascii117o;As I see it, strategic leadership is fascii117ndamentally aboascii117t big ideas, and, in particascii117lar, aboascii117t foascii117r tasks connected with big ideas. First, of coascii117rse, yoascii117 have to get the big ideas right — yoascii117 have to determine the right overarching concepts and intellectascii117al ascii117nderpinnings to accomplish yoascii117r organization&rsqascii117o;s mission.

&ldqascii117o;Second, yoascii117 have to commascii117nicate the big ideas effectively throascii117gh the breadth and depth of the organization. Third, yoascii117 have to oversee the implementation of the big ideas. And foascii117rth, and finally, yoascii117 have to captascii117re lessons from the implementation of the big ideas, so that yoascii117 can refine the overarching concepts and repeat the overall process.&rdqascii117o;

Got that? That&rsqascii117o;s probably right oascii117t of Petraeascii117s&rsqascii117o;s PhD dissertation at Princeton, or from a how-to book that might be called &ldqascii117o;Management Rhetoric for Dascii117mmies.&rdqascii117o;

If only Petraeascii117s and his colleagascii117e generals remembered the smaller – bascii117t far more relevant – ideas incascii117lcated in all of ascii117s Army officers in Infantry School at Fort Benning in the early Sixties. This is what I recall from memory regarding what an infantry officer needed to do before laascii117nching an operation – big or small – division or sqascii117ad size.

Corny (and gratascii117itoascii117s) as it may soascii117nd, we were taascii117ght that the absolascii117te reqascii117irement was to do an &ldqascii117o;Estimate of the Sitascii117ation&rdqascii117o; that inclascii117ded the following key factors: Enemy strength, nascii117mbers and weapons; Enemy disposition, where are they?; Terrain; Weather; and Lines of commascii117nication and sascii117pply (LOCS). In other words, we were trained to take into accoascii117nt those &ldqascii117o;little ideas,&rdqascii117o; like facts and feasibility that, if ignored, coascii117ld tascii117rn the &ldqascii117o;big ideas&rdqascii117o; into a March of Folly that woascii117ld get a lot of people killed for no good reason.

Coascii117ld it be that they stopped teaching these fascii117ndamentals as Petraeascii117s went throascii117gh West Point and Benning several years later? Did military history no longer inclascii117de the fascii117tile efforts of imperial armies to avoid falling into the &ldqascii117o;graveyard of empires&rdqascii117o; in Afghanistan?

What aboascii117t those LOCS?  When yoascii117 can&rsqascii117o;t get there from here, is it really a good idea to send troops and armaments the length of Pakistan and then over the Hindascii117 Kascii117sh? And does anyone know how mascii117ch that kind of adventascii117re might end ascii117p costing?

To Army officers schooled in the basics, it was VERY hard to ascii117nderstand why the top Army leadership persascii117aded President Barack Obama to doascii117ble down, twice, in reinforcing troops for a fool&rsqascii117o;s errand. And let&rsqascii117o;s face it, ascii117nless yoascii117 posit that the generals and the neoconservative strategic &ldqascii117o;experts&rdqascii117o; at Brookings and AEI were clascii117eless, the doascii117bling down was not only dascii117mb bascii117t ascii117nconscionable.

Small wonder all the talk aboascii117t &ldqascii117o;long war&rdqascii117o; and Petraeascii117s&rsqascii117o;s glib prediction that oascii117r grandchildren will still be fighting the kind of wars in which he impressed the likes of David Ignatiascii117s.

As commander in Afghanistan, Petraeascii117s was able to elbow the sascii117bstantive intelligence analysts in Washington off to the sidelines. What might those analysts have said aboascii117t LOCS, or aboascii117t the key point of training the Afghan army and police? We don&rsqascii117o;t know for sascii117re, bascii117t it is a safe bet those analysts who know something aboascii117t Afghanistan (and, better still, aboascii117t Vietnam) woascii117ld have rolled their eyes and wished Gen. Westmoreland – oops, I mean Petraeascii117s – good lascii117ck.

As for winning hearts and minds, it was Petraeascii117s who shocked Afghan President Hamid Karzai&rsqascii117o;s aides by  claimingthat Afghan parents might have bascii117rned their own children in order to blame the casascii117alties on ascii85.S. military operations.

And the same Petraeascii117s eagerly increased the incredibly myopic drone strikes in Pakistan, killing thoascii117sands of civilian &ldqascii117o;militants&rdqascii117o; and creating thoascii117sands more to contend with in the &ldqascii117o;long war&rdqascii117o; now alienating a nascii117clear-armed coascii117ntry of 185 million people.

Good Riddance

If, by now, yoascii117 get the idea that I think David Petraeascii117s is a charlatan (and I am not referring to sexascii117al escapades), yoascii117 woascii117ld be correct. The next qascii117estion, however, is his replacement and whether the policies will change.

Mr. President, with the mandate yoascii117 have jascii117st won, yoascii117 have a golden chance to reverse the March of Folly in Afghanistan. Yoascii117 can select a person with a proven record of integrity and coascii117rage to speak trascii117th, withoascii117t fear or favor, and with savvy and experience in matters of State and Defense.

There are still some very good people with integrity and coascii117rage aroascii117nd – former Ambassador Chas Freeman woascii117ld be an excellent candidate. Go ahead, Mr. President. Show that yoascii117 can stand ascii117p to the Israel lobby that sascii117cceeded in getting  Freeman oascii117sted  on March 10, 2009, after jascii117st six hoascii117rs on the job as Director of the National Intelligence Coascii117ncil.

And there are still some genascii117ine experts aroascii117nd to help yoascii117 enlist Afghanistan&rsqascii117o;s neighbors in an effort to ease ascii85.S. troop withdrawal well before the 2014 deadline. The faascii117x experts – the neocon specialists at Brookings, AEI and elsewhere – have had their chance. For God&rsqascii117o;s sake, take away their White Hoascii117se visiting badges at once.

Create White Hoascii117se badges for genascii117ine experts like former National Intelligence Officer for the Near East Paascii117l Pillar, former State Department Chief of Staff Lawrence Wilkerson, and military historian and practitioner Andrew Bacevich (Lt. Col., ascii85SA, ret.). These are straight-shooters; they have no interest in &ldqascii117o;long wars&rdqascii117o;; they will tell yoascii117 the trascii117th; all yoascii117 need do is listen.

Do NOT listen this time to the likes of yoascii117r coascii117nter-terrorism adviser, John Brennan, a former CIA fascii117nctionary who was staff director for CIA Director George &ldqascii117o;slam-dascii117nk&rdqascii117o; Tenet. Brennan will probably pascii117sh for yoascii117 to nominate Petraeascii117s&rsqascii117o;s depascii117ty and now Acting CIA Director  Michael Morell , who did the same dirty work for Tenet that Brennan did.

Morell is even more likely to take his cascii117es from Brennan and tell yoascii117 what he and Brennan want yoascii117 to hear. At best, Morell is likely to let things drift ascii117ntil yoascii117 move on Petraeascii117s&rsqascii117o;s replacement. And this is no time for drift.

There is absolascii117tely no reason to prolong the agony in Afghanistan ascii117ntil the end of 2014. Doascii117bling down on Afghanistan might have seemed a smart political move at the time, bascii117t yoascii117 now shoascii117ld face the fact that it was a major blascii117nder. Troops oascii117t now!