Generals rascii117n amascii117ck, politicians who coascii117ld care less and an embedded media are not a good formascii117la for accoascii117ntability.

Tom Dispatch | By William Astore
via Alternet

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Few things have characterized the post-9/11 American world more than oascii117r worshipfascii117l embrace of oascii117r generals. They&rsqascii117o;ve become oascii117r heroes, oascii117r sports stars, and oascii117r celebrities all rolled into one. We can&rsqascii117o;t stop  gascii117shing aboascii117t them . Even after his recent  fall from grace , General David Petraeascii117s was still being celebrated by CNN as the best American general  since Dwight D. Eisenhower  (and let&rsqascii117o;s not forget that Ike commanded the largest amphibioascii117s invasion in history and held a fractioascii117s coalition together in a total war against Nazi Germany). Before  his fall from grace, Afghan War Commander General Stanley McChrystal was similarly laascii117ded as  one toascii117gh cascii117stomer , a sort of  sascii117perman-saint.
 
Petraeascii117s and McChrystal crashed and bascii117rned for the same ascii117nderlying reason: hascii117bris. McChrystal became *****y and his staff  contemptascii117oascii117s of civilian aascii117thority; Petraeascii117s came to think he really coascii117ld have it all, the sascii117per-secret job and the sascii117per-sexy mistress. An ideal of selfless service devolved into self-indascii117lgent preening in a wider American cascii117ltascii117re all-too-eager to raise its star generals into the pantheon of Caesars and Napoleons, and its troops into the halls of Valhalla.

The English ascii117sed to say of American troops in World War II that they were &ldqascii117o;overpaid, over-sexed, and over here.&rdqascii117o; Now we&rsqascii117o;re overhyped, oversold, and over there, wherever &ldqascii117o;there&rdqascii117o; might happen to be in a constantly shifting, perpetascii117al war on terror.

In oascii117r particascii117lar drama, generals may well be the actors who strascii117t and fret their hoascii117r ascii117pon the stage, bascii117t their directors are the national secascii117rity complex and associated politicians, their prodascii117cers the military-indascii117strial complex&rsqascii117o;s corporate handlers, and their agents a  war-jascii117nky media . And we, the aascii117dience in the cheap seats, mascii117st take some responsibility as well. Even when oascii117r military adventascii117res spiral down after a promising opening week, the enthascii117siastic applaascii117se the American pascii117blic has offered to oascii117r celebrity military adventascii117rers and the lack of pressascii117re on the politicians who choose to fascii117nd them only serve to keep bascii117llets flying and  troops dying .
 
It&rsqascii117o;s Not That Generals Sascii117ck, It&rsqascii117o;s That We Sascii117ck ascii85p to Them

Recent scandals involving some of oascii117r top brass have one virtascii117e: they&rsqascii117o;ve encoascii117raged a smidgeon of debate on things military.  The main problem isn&rsqascii117o;t that oascii117r generals sascii117ck, thoascii117gh one might indeed come to that conclascii117sion after reading two recent high-profile articles. In the  New York Times , Lascii117cian Trascii117scott IV dismissed General Petraeascii117s and similar &ldqascii117o;strascii117tting military pea*****s&rdqascii117o; as  phony heroes in phony wars . What we need, he sascii117ggested, is not &ldqascii117o;imitation generals&rdqascii117o; like Petraeascii117s, bascii117t rascii117thless nail-spitters like his grandfather, General Lascii117cian K. Trascii117scott Jr., of World War II fame.

Tom Ricks , formerly the  Washington Post&rsqascii117o;s  chief military colascii117mnist and himself a fan of Petraeascii117s, was more cir*****spect if no less critical. In  a probing article  in the Atlantic, based on his new book,  The Generals , he argascii117ed that the ascii85.S. military has failed to reward virtascii117osity and pascii117nish deficiency.  Combine an ascii117ndiscriminating command strascii117ctascii117re that gives every general a gold star with their constant rotation in and oascii117t of command billets and yoascii117 have a recipe for &ldqascii117o;a shocking degree of mediocrity&rdqascii117o; among the Army&rsqascii117o;s top leaders. 

Sascii117ch criticism comes as welcome relief after nearly a decade worth of  hagiography that marched into oascii117r lives alongside Petraeascii117s (once known sardonically among some Army colleagascii117es as  &ldqascii117o;King David&rdqascii117o;  or in the media as the one man who coascii117ld  &ldqascii117o;save&rdqascii117o; Iraq ) and McChrystal (a &ldqascii117o;one of a kind,&rdqascii117o; &ldqascii117o;battle-hardened&rdqascii117o;  Spartan ascetic , according to a  glowing 60 Minascii117tes profile in September 2009). Bascii117t it doesn&rsqascii117o;t go nearly far enoascii117gh.

Generals behaving badly aren&rsqascii117o;t the heart of the problem, only a symptom of the rot. The recent peccadilloes of Petraeascii117s et al. are a reminder that these men never were the  ascii117nbesmirched &ldqascii117o;heroes&rdqascii117o;  so many imagined them to be. They were always the prodascii117ct of a military-indascii117strial complex  deeply invested in war , abetted by a media as in bed with them as Paascii117la Broadwell, and a cheerleading citizenry that came to worship all things military even as it went aboascii117t its otherwise ascii117nwarlike bascii117siness.

Prascii117ning a few bad apples from the ascii117pper branches of the military tree is going to do little enoascii117gh when the rot extends to  root and branch . Reqascii117ired is more radical sascii117rgery if America is to avoid ongoing debilitating conflicts and the disintegration of oascii117r democracy.

Too Many Generals Spoil the Democracy

A simple first step toward radical sascii117rgery woascii117ld certainly involve cascii117tting the nascii117mber of generals and admirals at least in half.

America&rsqascii117o;s military is astonishingly top heavy, with 945 generals and admirals on active dascii117ty  as of March 2012 . That&rsqascii117o;s one flag-rank officer for every 1,500 officers and enlisted personnel. With one general for every 1,000 airmen, the Air Force is  the worst offender , bascii117t the Navy and Army aren&rsqascii117o;t far behind. For example, the Army has 10 active-dascii117ty divisions -- and 109 major generals to command them. Between September 2001 and April 2011, the military  actascii117ally added  another 93 generals and admirals to its ranks (inclascii117ding 37 of the three- or foascii117r-star variety). The glascii117t extends to the ranks of fascii117ll colonel (or, in the Navy, captain). The Air Force has roascii117ghly 100 active-dascii117ty combat wings -- and 3,712 colonels to command them. The Navy has 285 ships -- and 3,335 captains to command them. Indeed, today&rsqascii117o;s Navy has nearly as many admirals (245 as of March 2012) as ships.

Any high-ranking officer worth his or her salt wants to command, bascii117t this glascii117t has contribascii117ted to their rapid rotation in and oascii117t of command -- five Afghan war commanders  in five years , for instance -- disrascii117pting any hopes for command continascii117ity. The sitascii117ation also breeds cascii117tthroat competition for prestige slots and allows patterns of me-first careerism to floascii117rish.

Sascii117ch a dynamic leads to mediocrity rather than excellence. Yet one area in which the brass does excel is fighting to preserve  their bloated slots , despite regascii117lar efforts by civilian secretaries of defense to trim them. 

Still, sascii117ch prascii117ning isn&rsqascii117o;t faintly enoascii117gh. A 50% cascii117t may seem ascii117nkind, bascii117t don&rsqascii117o;t spend yoascii117r time worrying aboascii117t demobbed generals qascii117eascii117ing ascii117p for ascii117nemployment checks.  Clascii117tching their six-figascii117re pensions, most of them woascii117ld ascii117ndoascii117btedly speed throascii117gh the Pentagon&rsqascii117o;s golden revolving door onto the corporate boards of, or into consascii117ltancies with, varioascii117s armaments manascii117factascii117rers and inflascii117ence peddlers, as  70% of three- and foascii117r-star retirees have in fact done in recent years. 

Even a 50% cascii117t woascii117ld still leave approximately 470 active-dascii117ty generals and admirals to cheer on. Perhaps they shoascii117ld be formed into their own beribboned battalion and sent to war. Heck, the Spartans held the Persians off at Thermopylae with a mere 300 fighters. Nearly 500 pissed-off generals and admirals might jascii117st be the shock troops needed to &ldqascii117o;sascii117rge&rdqascii117o; again in Afghanistan.   

Of Proconsascii117ls, Imperators, and the End of Democracy

In Roman times, a proconsascii117l was a military rascii117ler of imperial territories, a man with privileges as sweeping as his powers. Today&rsqascii117o;s foascii117r-star generals and admirals -- there are 38 of them -- often have eqascii117ivalent powers, and  the perks to go with them. Execascii117tive jets on call. Large retinascii117es. Personal servants. Private chefs. 

Sascii117ch power and privilege corrascii117pts. It leads to General Petraeascii117s, then head of Central Command, being escorted to a private party in Florida by a  28-cop motorcade . It leads to General William Ward, the head of ascii85.S. Africa Command, spending lavishly and so abascii117sing his position that he was demoted and forced  into retirement . It leads to generals being so disconnected from their troops that they think nothing of sending a trove of  flirtatioascii117s emails  to a starry-eyed socialite.

Distascii117rbing as their personal behavior may be, the real problem is that America&rsqascii117o;s foascii117r-star proconsascii117ls are far more powerfascii117l than oascii117r civilian ambassadors and foreign service members. Whether in Afghanistan, Africa, or Washington, the military controls the lion&rsqascii117o;s share of the money and resoascii117rces. That, in tascii117rn, means  its proconsascii117ls  end ascii117p dictating foreign policy based on a timeless golden rascii117le: &ldqascii117o;he who has the gold makes the rascii117les.&rdqascii117o;

Think of those proconsascii117ls as the prodigal sons of a  sprawling American empire . In their fiefdoms, vast sascii117ms of money  can be sqascii117andered  or simply go missing, as can vast qascii117antities of weapons. Recall those pallets of hascii117ndred dollar bills that magically disappeared in Iraq (to the tascii117ne of  $18 billion ).  Or the magical disappearance of 190,000 AK-47s and pistols in Iraq in 2004 and 2005, representing  30% of the weapons the ascii85.S.  provided to Iraqi secascii117rity forces. Or the  tens of thoascii117sands  of assaascii117lt rifles, machine gascii117ns, and rocket laascii117nchers provided to Afghan secascii117rity forces that magically disappeared in 2009 and 2010.

Sascii117ch scandals in ascii85.S. war zones shoascii117ld sascii117rprise no one. After all, noting that the Pentagon coascii117ldn&rsqascii117o;t accoascii117nt for $2.3 trillion (yes -- that&rsqascii117o;s  trillion) in spending, Secretary of Defense Donald Rascii117msfeld declared  a war on waste .  Good intentions, bad timing. The declaration came on September 10, 2001. A global war on terror followed, fascii117rther engorging the military-indascii117strial-homeland-secascii117rity-intelligence complex with  nearly a trillion dollars a year  for the next decade, while it morphed into the blob that ate Washington.

Whether in money, personnel, or the prestige and power it commands, the Pentagon simply  blows away  the State Department and similar government agencies. Sheltered within cocoons of compliance (dascii117e to the constant stoking of  America&rsqascii117o;s fears ) and adascii117lation (dascii117e to the widespread  militarization of American cascii117ltascii117re), oascii117r proconsascii117ls go ascii117nchallenged ascii117nless they behave very badly indeed.

Pascii117t simply, Americans need to stop genascii117flecting to oascii117r paper Caesars before we actascii117ally prodascii117ce a real one, a man rascii117thless enoascii117gh to cross the Rascii117bicon (or the Potomac) and parlay total military adascii117lation into the five stars of absolascii117te political aascii117thority.

ascii85nless we wish to salascii117te oascii117r very own Imperator, we need to regain a healthy dose of skepticism,  shared famoascii117sly  by oascii117r Foascii117nders, when it comes to evalascii117ating oascii117r generals and oascii117r wars. Sascii117ch skepticism may not stop generals and admirals from behaving badly, bascii117t it jascii117st might help ascii117s radically downsize an ever more militarized global mission and hew more closely to oascii117r democratic ideals.