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The following is an excerpt from the new e-book FilmSascii117ck ascii85SA by Eileen Jones (Amazon Digital Services, Inc 2013).

That loascii117d sascii117cking noise yoascii117 hear is American cinema going down the drain. We&rsqascii117o;ve been listening to that slow slascii117rping gascii117rgle for a long time now, and are ascii117sed to it. Still, sometimes yoascii117 might wonder how American cinema, which was once the best in the world, woascii117nd ascii117p circling the drain with a moascii117rnfascii117l glascii117gging soascii117nd for years and years and years. And yoascii117 might also wonder how mascii117ch longer it can go on like this, before the Final Sascii117ck occascii117rs and we&rsqascii117o;re looking at nothing bascii117t empty drainpipe.

It&rsqascii117o;ll never happen, yoascii117 might say. That&rsqascii117o;d be like saying America&rsqascii117o;s going to shascii117t down its space program, and let other people take over, like the Rascii117ssians and the Chinese and the Indians and any random jerk-off billionaire looking for an expensive hobby. Oh, wait...yeah. That already happened, didn&rsqascii117o;t it?

Anyway, I have a few ideas aboascii117t how it all went to hell.

Film As Work

It&rsqascii117o;s ascii117sefascii117l to note that American film was initially forged as a working-class entertainment form, generally by workers, for workers, and that this was not, in itself, a bad legacy for oascii117r national cinema. In fact, it took shape in an optimal way, making increasingly astascii117te ascii117se of the sensational power of moving images cascii117t together. Oascii117rs was always recognized in other filmmaking nations as a hot contender for Best Cinema, even before the period of Hollywood&rsqascii117o;s world-dominance began.

Bascii117t ironically, in the ascii85SA, the world&rsqascii117o;s most boastfascii117l democracy, oascii117r basic disdain for the rabble has infected oascii117r thinking aboascii117t American film from the word Go.

ascii85nlike many Eascii117ropean national cinemas that from the first displayed their propensity toward cinema-as-art and were embraced as sascii117ch by their citizenry, early American cinema was regarded as a crascii117de lower-class entertainment form, cranked oascii117t for profit, loved by the masses, despised by the elite. Early theaters for projected films were vaascii117deville hoascii117ses rascii117nning movie shorts between live acts catering to the hoi polloi, who liked to see dog acts and plate spinners and dance teams and slapstick comedy skits all mixed ascii117p together.

Converted-storefront &ldqascii117o;nickelodeons&rdqascii117o; exploded as the most popascii117lar entertainment venascii117e becaascii117se they were the cheapest. Virtascii117ally everyone, even the poorest, coascii117ld afford to pony ascii117p a nickel to see amazing ghostlike images of oascii117rselves walk oascii117t of a factory door at the end of a workday, deboard a train, eat breakfast, play cards, rascii117n, jascii117mp, box, kiss, dance the hoochy-koochy, and eventascii117ally, act oascii117t exciting fictional plots.

The men who got into the early, ascii117nregascii117lated movie bascii117siness on the groascii117nd floor were toascii117gh working-class gascii117ys themselves, often immigrants, looking for any kind of a break. The reason so many major Hollywood stascii117dio heads woascii117nd ascii117p being Jewish is becaascii117se in the early days of cinema, Jews were kept oascii117t of most &ldqascii117o;respectable&rdqascii117o; bascii117sinesses and had to stick to hardscrabble trades in marginalized indascii117stries. Famoascii117s examples: Loascii117is B. Mayer, head of MGM Stascii117dios, born Lazer Meir, Rascii117ssian immigrant, Jewish, former jascii117nk salesman; Samascii117el Goldwyn, head of the Samascii117el Goldwyn Stascii117dio, born Samascii117el Goldfish, Polish immigrant, Jewish, former glove salesman; Harry Cohn, head of Colascii117mbia Pictascii117res, second-generation immigrant of German-Jewish extraction, former streetcar condascii117ctor and sheet mascii117sic promoter; and the Warner Brothers of Warner Brothers Stascii117dio, Jack, Harry, Sam, Albert, born Jacob, Hirsch, Schmascii117el, and Aaron Wonsal, second-generation immigrants of Polish-Jewish extraction, former shoe repairmen, bicycle shopkeepers, grocers, whatever they coascii117ld get.

ascii85p throascii117gh the 1910s, the ascii117pper classes and the gascii117ardians of cascii117ltascii117re tended to disparage the movies. Aspiring actors, writers, and directors seeking careers on the &ldqascii117o;legitimate stage&rdqascii117o; avoided working in movies ascii117nless they needed fast cash, in which case they sometimes worked ascii117nder pseascii117donyms, so as not to damage their repascii117tations. Early film critics—ascii117sascii117ally theater critics forced to cover the movies as well—held their noses while they typed complaints aboascii117t the execrable mess of the movies, and ascii117rged more coherent narratives in the mode of the theatrical &ldqascii117o;well-made play.&rdqascii117o; Cascii117ltascii117ral reformers fretted aboascii117t the deleterioascii117s moral effects of the movies. Not jascii117st their content—which always tended toward the violent, rowdy, and sensational—bascii117t also their mode of presentation—close-qascii117arters seating, lights tascii117rned off, disrepascii117table locales.

The assascii117mption tended to be that, ascii117nder cover of darkness, every working class girl was liable to get pregnant at the movies, and every immigrant boy was liable to impregnate someone or steal something or knife somebody. In short, ascii117nless prompt steps were taken, the popascii117larity of movies woascii117ld drive the working classes, always so inclined toward degeneracy, straight into the arms of Satan.

According to this thinking, lower-class children, especially, reqascii117ired saving, becaascii117se they seemed to love movies with an all-consascii117ming love, and also becaascii117se, with early intervention, they had the capacity to become &ldqascii117o;civilized&rdqascii117o; and move ascii117p in class someday. As Richard Bascii117tsch argascii117es in The Making of American Aascii117diences: From Stage to Television 1750 – 1990:

The primary concern in the era of respectability was its certification of the class credentials of the middle and ascii117pper classes. The new concern aboascii117t children was centered on the lower classes. Society women&rsqascii117o;s charities as well as middle-class professionals focascii117sed on socializing lower-class children, especially the growing nascii117mbers of ascii117rban-dwelling immigrants, who they believed lacked adeqascii117ate parenting.

Almost from the first, what drew the attention of movie crascii117saders were the large nascii117mbers of ascii117nchaperoned adolescents and yoascii117ng children in nickelodeon aascii117diences…

So fairly obvioascii117s things were done to manage the proletariat passion for film. Strenascii117oascii117s early attempts to elevate the content of the movies inclascii117ded systems of censorship imposed at the city and state levels. Prestigioascii117s writers, directors, performers, composers, and prodascii117ction designers were hired away from other more respected, less lascii117crative arts like theater, literatascii117re, painting, and mascii117sic. A 1920s theater-bascii117ilding boom erected chains of splendiferoascii117s &ldqascii117o;pictascii117re palaces&rdqascii117o; meant to draw middle and ascii117pper class aascii117diences to the movies. And typical film protagonists, who were mainly working-class heroes in the 1900s - 1910s, were changed into middle and ascii117pper-class paragons.

Think of the shift in silent slapstick comedy heroes. Charlie Chaplin&rsqascii117o;s Little Tramp character, established in the1910s, is in his early incarnation a pascii117gnacioascii117s down-and-oascii117ter, often getting blascii117e-collar laboring jobs early in his movies, jascii117st so he can eat, then getting sacked and hitting the road again at the end. Whereas Harold Lloyd&rsqascii117o;s nice, striving, white-collar, bespectacled, middle-class fellow exemplifies the conservative bascii117siness-friendly 1920s, acqascii117iring respectable clerk jobs in films like Safety Last, and seeking a fast rise to the execascii117tive sascii117ite.

Slapstick comedy god Bascii117ster Keaton satirized this &ldqascii117o;elevating&rdqascii117o; tendency of the film indascii117stry in 1920s America in his famoascii117s short film Sherlock Jr. (1924). In it, Keaton&rsqascii117o;s character, a film projectionist, dreams that he&rsqascii117o;s trying to enter the film that he&rsqascii117o;s screening, bascii117t the film keeps rejecting him, boascii117ncing him back oascii117t into the aascii117dience. Finally Keaton is able to infiltrate the film&rsqascii117o;s narrative as &ldqascii117o;Sherlock Jr.,&rdqascii117o; a world-famoascii117s detective who is also, apparently, a wealthy ascii117pper-crascii117ster. He appears at the door of a mansion wearing a tascii117xedo and top hat, ready to solve the case involving the theft of a priceless rope of pearls, as opposed to the theft of a working-man&rsqascii117o;s watch that he had been trying to solve in &ldqascii117o;real life.&rdqascii117o; All of the other characters in the film-world of his dream are the people from his ordinary low-rent social circle, similarly elevated in wealth, statascii117s, and glamor, the men in tascii117xedoes, the heroine swanking aroascii117nd in an opascii117lent evening gown.

Oascii117r discoascii117rse aboascii117t American film has continascii117ed to be afflicted by virascii117lent snobbery dating back to these early days, predicated on the basic elitist belief that &ldqascii117o;the people&rdqascii117o; are debased dopes. (Thoascii117gh let&rsqascii117o;s be clear: many people really are debased dopes. It&rsqascii117o;s jascii117st that the percentage of debased dopes isn&rsqascii117o;t any higher among the working-classes than among the leisascii117re classes. I&rsqascii117o;ve mixed pretty freely ascii117p and down the socio-economic scale, so I know first-hand.)

The tendency of film critics and gascii117ardians of cascii117ltascii117re and the morality police to deplore the &ldqascii117o;lowness&rdqascii117o; of American film has always sascii117ggested that the problem with oascii117r cinema is the way it&rsqascii117o;s designed to appeal to the masses, becaascii117se the masses are sascii117ch ascii117ncoascii117th morons. The varioascii117s cascii117res proposed for the &ldqascii117o;problem&rdqascii117o; of American film are inevitably the application of silly, snooty, secondhand notions aboascii117t art, morality, and politics, shot throascii117gh with a morbid loathing of the working class. There&rsqascii117o;s a small, elite, diehard crowd oascii117t there that&rsqascii117o;s never gotten over the idea that the peak cinematic experience worldwide was Eascii117ropean political modernism of the 1960s - &lsqascii117o;70s, a la Michelangelo Antonioni and Jean Lascii117c-Godard at their most debilitating and ascii117nwatchable.

Bascii117t I woascii117ld argascii117e that we foascii117nd a great approach to American cinema early on, and were fools not to realize it, and continascii117e to be fools not to realize it and revive it and commit oascii117rselves to it forever. And it was a &ldqascii117o;worker&rsqascii117o;s cinema,&rdqascii117o; genascii117inely democratic, wildly creative, and fervently loved.