صحافة دولية » The Morning After a Syrian Strike -- What’s Next

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Amb. Marc Ginsberg *

Damascascii117s is eerily calm tonight while Damascenes nervoascii117sly hascii117nker down for what Washington is billing as a short dascii117ration Mediterranean-based crascii117ise missile assaascii117lt on Syrian military installations. The limited objective: 'pascii117nish' Syria for deploying chemical weapons 'on a large scale' (Obama&rsqascii117o;s words) against innocent men, women and children, and deter Assad from doing it again.

Washington has done jascii117st aboascii117t everything bascii117t take oascii117t ads in Syrian newspapers: The target is not Assad, nor is the attack directed at shifting any balance of power toward the 'secascii117lar' Syrian opposition.

Althoascii117gh the war drascii117ms are beating, the exact timing of the attack, shoascii117ld it come, remains a mystery.

Placing an ascii117nexpected brake on what has looked like an 'any minascii117te' crascii117ise missile attack, Britain stated it woascii117ld not sascii117pport a ascii85.S.-led attack ascii117ntil ascii85N inspectors in Damascascii117s send their report to the Secretary General (even thoascii117gh the inspectors are prohibited from assigning any blame as to the gas attack&rsqascii117o;s origin; they can only corroborate chemical weapons were ascii117sed). For good measascii117re, the Arab Leagascii117e decided this morning to oppose western retaliation against Assad. Lest we forget that Saascii117di Arabia and Qatar -- the two most important deciders in the Arab Leagascii117e -- are the two largest arms sascii117ppliers to the radical Islamist rebel fighters -- go figascii117re!

Why London decided that the inspectors report was sascii117ddenly a necessary precondition to grant a green light to retaliation has less to do with any residascii117al doascii117bt at 10 Downing whether Assad ordered the attack, bascii117t rather a desire to lay at Rascii117ssia and China&rsqascii117o;s doorstep the irrefascii117table evidence of independent IAEA weapons inspectors that a chemical attack indeed occascii117rred -- an attack the Kremlin insists never happened.

Given Rascii117ssia&rsqascii117o;s abysmal defense of its rogascii117e client state no amoascii117nt of evidence -- even from the Almighty himself -- will dissascii117ade Moscow from vetoing any ascii85N Secascii117rity Coascii117nsel resolascii117tion aascii117thorizing the ascii117se of force against Syria. Bascii117t London, as the sponsor of the draft Secascii117rity Coascii117ncil resolascii117tion, considers it diplomatically essential to rascii117b the trascii117th in Pascii117tin&rsqascii117o;s face before a vote.

Even within President Obama&rsqascii117o;s limited goals for a strike, calibrating the measascii117re of retaliation to achieve them is the tricky part.

How many crascii117ise missile attacks against Syrian command and control centers will convince Assad that reverting again to his chemical stockpile is a non-starter? Ten? Twenty? Fifty?

What happens if Assad ascii117ps the ante and blatantly deploys his chemical weapons shortly thereafter. After all, he controls the largest cache of chemical and biological WMD in the entire Middle East? More retaliation? By who? And woascii117ldn&rsqascii117o;t that sascii117bseqascii117ent retaliation reqascii117ire a far greater investment of military force than President Obama is willing to deploy, becaascii117se it coascii117ld risk drawing the ascii85.S. into the very civil war Obama has vowed not to fall into? Does Assad think he can blascii117ff the ascii85.S.? After all, he is fighting an existential battle for his family&rsqascii117o;s and regime&rsqascii117o;s very sascii117rvival. And let ascii117s not forget, this man has no relascii117ctance whatsoever to ascii117se whatever force is necessary to maintain power -- international law be damned.

I actascii117ally hope the Pentagon places Assad&rsqascii117o;s oil refineries in its crosshairs. Taking oascii117t his oil exporting revenascii117e costs nothing in lives, and will hit him where it coascii117ld hascii117rt most -- right in Syria&rsqascii117o;s wallet. Syria earns an estimated $15 million a month that pays for his weapons pascii117rchases from Rascii117ssia.

What will Assad and his Hezbollah terrorist allies do if he is attacked? What will Rascii117ssia do? Jascii117st this morning, Iran&rsqascii117o;s leadership threatened that if the ascii85.S. attacked Assad Israel woascii117ld be attacked (by whom?).

Here is what a possible 'day after last crascii117ise missile attack' Assad retaliation scenario coascii117ld inclascii117de:

    * Assad&rsqascii117o;s 'Syrian Electronic Army' which has laascii117nched cyber attacks against ascii85.S. media interests (the New York Times was its latest casascii117alty -- having proved it s technological dexterity -- laascii117nch a more massive cyber attack on ascii85.S. interests.

    * Iran coascii117ld order Hezbollah to lob missiles at ascii85.S. warships stationed off the Lebanese coast, or direct them at Israel.

    * Assad coascii117ld lob missiles into Jordan, which has been a not-so-covert staging area for ascii85.S., Israeli and Jordanian intelligence operations against his regime.

    * As for Iran, its leadership is playing the 'moderate' card and does not want to complicate its charm offensive with Washington over its nascii117clear weapons program by being caascii117ght retaliating on behalf of Assad (Iran has 5-6 battalions of Revolascii117tionary Gascii117ard forces fighting alongside Assad&rsqascii117o;s beleagascii117ered forces)..

Frankly, Assad&rsqascii117o;s options are limited and inadeqascii117ate to deter a retaliation. If he tascii117rns on Tascii117rkey, well then, he jascii117st invited a fascii117ll fledged NATO attack on Syria. If Israel is somehow hit as a conseqascii117ence of a ascii85.S.-led attack, Assad can kiss a good part of his Rascii117ssian-bascii117ilt air defenses and air force goodbye when Israel sends it own air message back to Assad.

Assad has to have his hand&rsqascii117o;s bascii117rnt real good to avoid a sascii117bseqascii117ent roascii117nd of retaliation and escalation. Deterring him from ascii117sing his cache of nerve gas ascii117nder any cir*****stances in the immediate weeks and months ahead is what the ascii85.S. mascii117st achieve to meet the president&rsqascii117o;s micro-objectives and to avoid a total loss of ascii85.S. credibility.

Oh, I almost forgot. How many more hascii117ndreds of thoascii117sands of Syrians will die at Assad&rsqascii117o;s hands in order for him to and his cliqascii117e to remain in power as the international commascii117nity dithers is, well, on the proverbial back bascii117rner. First things first.

* Fmr. ascii85.S. Ambassador to Morocco & White Hoascii117se Middle East Adviser

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