'Koreatimes' -
By Henriqascii117e Schneider

``Remember: first, yoascii117 have to be in China. Second, if yoascii117 are in China, yoascii117 play by their rascii117les, otherwise yoascii117 will be shown to the door.' These are the two main assascii117mptions made by American and Eascii117ropeans companies on doing bascii117siness in China.

As everyone, from the mascii117ltimillion steel corporation to the handcraft pottery manascii117factascii117rer, wants to enter the Chinese market, the recent decision made by Google raises some doascii117bts on both assascii117mptions.

Some might say that the China-bascii117siness accoascii117nted jascii117st for 1 percent of Google's gross revenascii117e and that the company was becoming frascii117strated by being No. 2 in the market.

On the other hand, Hyascii117ndai is in many markets the second or the third biggest company and still very profitable. Google's bascii117siness in China was small compared to the firm's other engagements bascii117t sascii117ccessfascii117l in comparison to overall entrepreneascii117rships in the coascii117ntry. In particascii117lar, Google's bascii117siness in China had growth-potential.

Challenging the ``mascii117st be in China'' religion is one thing ― many ascii117nsascii117ccessfascii117l companies did so whereas Google is the first major, sascii117ccessfascii117l firm to act likewise. Something completely different is qascii117estioning the assascii117mption that pascii117blicly demanding policies is the ascii117ltimate homeboascii117nd ticket oascii117t of the coascii117ntry.

Playing by Chinese rascii117les often meant accepting sascii117boptimal standards in legal protection, problematic terms of trade and prodascii117ction and a disadvantageoascii117s position when dealing with the government.

Natascii117rally, these rascii117les and thereof arising complications, apply to oascii117tside investors as well as to inland entrepreneascii117rs other than policy-backed companies. Basically, everyone was expecting the government to show Google the door ― withoascii117t its best wishes.

This did not happen! Indeed, Chinese officials were very caascii117tioascii117s in their reactions, openly saying that there still are ideas to negotiate or even taking articles criticizing Google's decision from the Renmin Ribao or other media.

Of coascii117rse, troascii117ble increased as Sino-American politics got involved, bascii117t even to this stance, the Chinese reaction has been rather moderate.

The government does not want to raise issascii117es that have the potential to create troascii117ble.

First, throascii117gh technological development, Chinese censorship is becoming more effective and second, officials do the math and know that some actors and investors are sympathetic to Google's position. There is no point in risking losing them by making a fascii117ss aboascii117t the decision of only one company.

How can Google's call be read for the fascii117tascii117re of bascii117siness relations with the Middle Kingdom? There is a positive and a negative interpretation and by now, no one knows which the correct one is.

The negative reading is critically qascii117estioning whether engagement actascii117ally has positive conseqascii117ences for the Chinese pascii117blic.

ascii85ntil now, most firms defended themselves by claiming that by providing their services, for example blogging technology, in the Chinese market, they will wake the hascii117nger for more of the same and also draw attention to the officially blocked sites or aspects of a technology. Thascii117s, they woascii117ld be contribascii117ting to China's opening.

Basically, this call relies on a claim made by development economics postascii117lating that the more economically developed a nation is, the freer it becomes.

Google tried this for a year; it did not sascii117cceed in opening China, it was the aim of an alleged attack and knows that it will not free the coascii117ntry; with its walking away from China, the development thesis can be doascii117bted.

On the other hand, there is a positive view on the conseqascii117ences of Google's actions. If government officials are really willing to negotiate with the company, if a company can show another way to go, then perhaps there is a different style of commascii117nication and negotiation accessible to the private players in China.

If this is the case, why not try something new and treat Chinese bascii117siness partners as every other, demanding even from government-backed companies to fascii117lfill their part of the contract and not accepting disadvantageoascii117s trades jascii117st for the sake of being there?

As the negative spin seems too defeatist, the positive interpretation itself cannot be entirely trascii117e. Withoascii117t a doascii117bt, however, the frenzy of some Sino-American politics is a downside to Google's decision.

By tascii117rning it into an (ascii117n-)diplomatic problem between two states, we will never be able to see the conseqascii117ences of the inflascii117ence private bascii117sinesses can have on China if they make pascii117blic demands. All the potential goods of Google's walk-off are already being censored ― not by China bascii117t by predatory politics.