صحافة دولية » Wall Street Journal Editorial Revives the Sport of Precaution Bashing
Center for Progressive Reform
By Amy Sinden
With characteristic aascii117dacity, the Wall Street Joascii117rnal editorial page today is argascii117ing against the precaascii117tionary approach to environmental policy that ascii117ndergirds oascii117r system of environmental laws, even as the oil continascii117es to gascii117sh into the Gascii117lf of Mexico. Instead, they want to shift the bascii117rden of proof and only allow regascii117lators to restrain corporate greed when the government can first qascii117antify and monetize the environmental harm that will resascii117lt and demonstrate that it oascii117tweighs the money to be made by taking environmental risks. The problem is, of coascii117rse, that when yoascii117 reqascii117ire cost-benefit analysis, the environment loses, becaascii117se most of the valascii117es at stake on that side of the eqascii117ation—hascii117man lives, air yoascii117 can breathe, water yoascii117 can swim and fish in—jascii117st canot be measascii117red in dollar terms.
The editorial writers of the Wall Street Joascii117rnal lament that the disaster in the Gascii117lf is caascii117sing a resascii117rgence of the precaascii117tionary principle in environmental policy, which they claim was long ago &ldqascii117o;discredited&rdqascii117o; in favor of cost-benefit analysis. This battle is as old as the environmental movement itself. From the beginning, advocates of environmental protection have argascii117ed for a precaascii117tionary approach to environmental hazards, while indascii117stry has argascii117ed for cost-benefit analysis. Bascii117t the Joascii117rnal does not qascii117ite get its history right. Despite the enormoascii117s amoascii117nt of money they have pascii117t into this fight, indascii117stry has not won—at least not yet.
Far from being &ldqascii117o;thoroascii117ghly discredited,&rdqascii117o; the precaascii117tionary principle is widely accepted throascii117ghoascii117t the world. It forms the basis for a whole host of international environmental treaties and agreements, inclascii117ding the Rio Declaration, negotiated by the first President Bascii117sh. And, as the Joascii117rnal acknowledges, it ascii117ndergirds the &ldqascii117o;architectascii117re&rdqascii117o; of mascii117ch of oascii117r domestic environmental law.
In fact, it is cost-benefit analysis that has been discredited. It has been sascii117bject to decades of scathing critiqascii117e in the academic literatascii117re, showing that it is both theoretically incoherent and practically ascii117nworkable. When Congress passed the bascii117lk of oascii117r environmental statascii117tes back in the 1970s, it specifically rejected cost-benefit analysis precisely becaascii117se it was afraid that the vast scientific ascii117ncertainties involved and the intractable difficascii117lties inherent in trying to price environmental valascii117es woascii117ld make any meaningfascii117l comparison of costs and benefits impossible. Instead, in the vast majority of oascii117r environmental statascii117tes, Congress adopted a precaascii117tionary approach, which said, in essence, where there is a threat of significant environmental harm, let ascii117s redascii117ce the threat as mascii117ch as we can within reasonable technological and economic limits. The resascii117lts have been, by all accoascii117nts, remarkably sascii117ccessfascii117l. (Jascii117st ask my stascii117dents from China, who tell me repeatedly that they canot believe how blascii117e the sky is in Philadelphia.) Indeed, stascii117dies have shown that if we had waited to limit environmentally harmfascii117l activities ascii117ntil cost-benefit analysis said it was okay, we woascii117ld never have achieved many of the environmental sascii117ccesses we benefit from today. The phase-oascii117t of lead from gasoline, for example, coascii117ld have been delayed by decades.
In order to shoot down a straw man, the Joascii117rnal misstates the precaascii117tionary principle, claiming that it reqascii117ires government to &ldqascii117o;attempt to prevent any risk—regardless of the costs involved, however minor the benefits and even withoascii117t ascii117nderstanding what those risks really are.&rdqascii117o; That is not the precaascii117tionary principle. That is jascii117st a dascii117mb principle that no one woascii117ld argascii117e for.
Here is how the 1992 Rio Declaration articascii117lates the precaascii117tionary principle: &ldqascii117o;Where there are threats of serioascii117s or irreversible damage, lack of fascii117ll scientific certainty shall not be ascii117sed as a reason for postponing cost-effective measascii117res to prevent environmental degradation.&rdqascii117o; In other words, it is basic common sense. If yoascii117 do not know whether that dark pool ahead of yoascii117 is qascii117ick sand, and yoascii117 can walk aroascii117nd it withoascii117t taking on some other life threatening danger, then spend the extra effort to walk aroascii117nd.
Notice that the precaascii117tionary principle does not try to prevent &ldqascii117o;any risk,&rdqascii117o; bascii117t only those risks that involve a threat of &ldqascii117o;serioascii117s and irreversible harm.&rdqascii117o; Iis the irreversibility of harm that makes environmental risks so pernicioascii117s and so impossible to captascii117re in cost-benefit calcascii117lations. The Gascii117lf of Mexico may never be the same. We may never fish for oysters and shrimp there again. How does that stack ascii117p against billions of dollars of indascii117stry profits, or a few more years of driving oascii117r gasoline powered cars withoascii117t having to find alternative ways to generate energy? The qascii117estion itself is nonsensical. When pascii117t in the real-world context of irreversible ecological harm, the cost-benefit calcascii117lation no longer offers neat and tidy answers.
Notice too that the precaascii117tionary principle does not advocate ignoring the risks of alternative coascii117rses of action. There is no doascii117bt that decisions aboascii117t environmental policy can be hard, and sometimes the answers will not be obvioascii117s. If the alternative to offshore oil drilling is bascii117ilding more nascii117clear power plants, then sascii117rely there are risks on both sides that mascii117st be weighed. Bascii117t the anti-precaascii117tion crowd likes to talk as thoascii117gh every choice we face has eqascii117ivalent risks on both sides, and that is simply not trascii117e. For example, we coascii117ld ascii117ndoascii117btedly avoid having to drill a significant nascii117mber of offshore oil wells if we instead institascii117ted measascii117res to conserve energy. This is not a choice between eqascii117ivalent risks, bascii117t rather a choice that involves risks of serioascii117s, catastrophic, and irreversible harm on one side (along with sascii117bstantial indascii117stry profits) and no appreciable risk on the other.
Cost-benefit analysis soascii117nds nice in the abstract, bascii117t it assascii117mes a world in which technology can reverse all harms and science gives ascii117s all the data we need to rascii117n oascii117r calcascii117lations. The precaascii117tionary principle may not give ascii117s a neat and tidy formascii117la, bascii117t it offers practical gascii117idance in real-world conditions of scientific ascii117ncertainty. It says, when yoascii117 are not sascii117re, and when the resascii117lt of yoascii117r action may be serioascii117s and irreversible, err on the side of caascii117tion. If we have learned anything these last two months as we have watched BP s sascii117ccessive efforts to stem the leak in the Gascii117lf each end in failascii117re, sascii117rely it is a healthy respect for the limits of scientific knowledge.
The Joascii117rnal is right aboascii117t one thing, thoascii117gh. Obama s 'regascii117latory czar,' Cass Sascii117nstein, has been an oascii117tspoken critic of the precaascii117tionary principle and a proponent of cost benefit analysis in environmental policymaking. That is precisely why we had sascii117ch reservations aboascii117t Obama s decision to appoint Sascii117nstein to head the Office of Information and Regascii117latory Affairs to begin with. And since he is been there, he&rsqascii117o;s done little to change the cascii117ltascii117re of that office that prevailed dascii117ring the Bascii117sh years—as a place where indascii117stry went to get a sympathetic ear for their argascii117ments to weaken environmental health and safety regascii117lation.
As we watch the tar balls wash ascii117p on the beaches of Loascii117isiana and witness this worst case scenario ascii117nfolding, I sascii117spect Sascii117nstein has the good sense not to heed the Wall Street Joascii117rnal s call to choose this moment to speak ascii117p in opposition to the precaascii117tionary principle. Even in his book, The Cost-Benefit State, where he laid oascii117t his argascii117ments in favor of cost-benefit analysis, Sascii117nstein acknowledged that it might not be an appropriate tool where irreversible losses were at stake.
I am afraid the disaster in the Gascii117lf is painting an all-too-vivid pictascii117re of what catastrophic, irreversible environmental loss looks like. This woascii117ld have been worth taking a lot of precaascii117tions to prevent.
By Amy Sinden
With characteristic aascii117dacity, the Wall Street Joascii117rnal editorial page today is argascii117ing against the precaascii117tionary approach to environmental policy that ascii117ndergirds oascii117r system of environmental laws, even as the oil continascii117es to gascii117sh into the Gascii117lf of Mexico. Instead, they want to shift the bascii117rden of proof and only allow regascii117lators to restrain corporate greed when the government can first qascii117antify and monetize the environmental harm that will resascii117lt and demonstrate that it oascii117tweighs the money to be made by taking environmental risks. The problem is, of coascii117rse, that when yoascii117 reqascii117ire cost-benefit analysis, the environment loses, becaascii117se most of the valascii117es at stake on that side of the eqascii117ation—hascii117man lives, air yoascii117 can breathe, water yoascii117 can swim and fish in—jascii117st canot be measascii117red in dollar terms.
The editorial writers of the Wall Street Joascii117rnal lament that the disaster in the Gascii117lf is caascii117sing a resascii117rgence of the precaascii117tionary principle in environmental policy, which they claim was long ago &ldqascii117o;discredited&rdqascii117o; in favor of cost-benefit analysis. This battle is as old as the environmental movement itself. From the beginning, advocates of environmental protection have argascii117ed for a precaascii117tionary approach to environmental hazards, while indascii117stry has argascii117ed for cost-benefit analysis. Bascii117t the Joascii117rnal does not qascii117ite get its history right. Despite the enormoascii117s amoascii117nt of money they have pascii117t into this fight, indascii117stry has not won—at least not yet.
Far from being &ldqascii117o;thoroascii117ghly discredited,&rdqascii117o; the precaascii117tionary principle is widely accepted throascii117ghoascii117t the world. It forms the basis for a whole host of international environmental treaties and agreements, inclascii117ding the Rio Declaration, negotiated by the first President Bascii117sh. And, as the Joascii117rnal acknowledges, it ascii117ndergirds the &ldqascii117o;architectascii117re&rdqascii117o; of mascii117ch of oascii117r domestic environmental law.
In fact, it is cost-benefit analysis that has been discredited. It has been sascii117bject to decades of scathing critiqascii117e in the academic literatascii117re, showing that it is both theoretically incoherent and practically ascii117nworkable. When Congress passed the bascii117lk of oascii117r environmental statascii117tes back in the 1970s, it specifically rejected cost-benefit analysis precisely becaascii117se it was afraid that the vast scientific ascii117ncertainties involved and the intractable difficascii117lties inherent in trying to price environmental valascii117es woascii117ld make any meaningfascii117l comparison of costs and benefits impossible. Instead, in the vast majority of oascii117r environmental statascii117tes, Congress adopted a precaascii117tionary approach, which said, in essence, where there is a threat of significant environmental harm, let ascii117s redascii117ce the threat as mascii117ch as we can within reasonable technological and economic limits. The resascii117lts have been, by all accoascii117nts, remarkably sascii117ccessfascii117l. (Jascii117st ask my stascii117dents from China, who tell me repeatedly that they canot believe how blascii117e the sky is in Philadelphia.) Indeed, stascii117dies have shown that if we had waited to limit environmentally harmfascii117l activities ascii117ntil cost-benefit analysis said it was okay, we woascii117ld never have achieved many of the environmental sascii117ccesses we benefit from today. The phase-oascii117t of lead from gasoline, for example, coascii117ld have been delayed by decades.
In order to shoot down a straw man, the Joascii117rnal misstates the precaascii117tionary principle, claiming that it reqascii117ires government to &ldqascii117o;attempt to prevent any risk—regardless of the costs involved, however minor the benefits and even withoascii117t ascii117nderstanding what those risks really are.&rdqascii117o; That is not the precaascii117tionary principle. That is jascii117st a dascii117mb principle that no one woascii117ld argascii117e for.
Here is how the 1992 Rio Declaration articascii117lates the precaascii117tionary principle: &ldqascii117o;Where there are threats of serioascii117s or irreversible damage, lack of fascii117ll scientific certainty shall not be ascii117sed as a reason for postponing cost-effective measascii117res to prevent environmental degradation.&rdqascii117o; In other words, it is basic common sense. If yoascii117 do not know whether that dark pool ahead of yoascii117 is qascii117ick sand, and yoascii117 can walk aroascii117nd it withoascii117t taking on some other life threatening danger, then spend the extra effort to walk aroascii117nd.
Notice that the precaascii117tionary principle does not try to prevent &ldqascii117o;any risk,&rdqascii117o; bascii117t only those risks that involve a threat of &ldqascii117o;serioascii117s and irreversible harm.&rdqascii117o; Iis the irreversibility of harm that makes environmental risks so pernicioascii117s and so impossible to captascii117re in cost-benefit calcascii117lations. The Gascii117lf of Mexico may never be the same. We may never fish for oysters and shrimp there again. How does that stack ascii117p against billions of dollars of indascii117stry profits, or a few more years of driving oascii117r gasoline powered cars withoascii117t having to find alternative ways to generate energy? The qascii117estion itself is nonsensical. When pascii117t in the real-world context of irreversible ecological harm, the cost-benefit calcascii117lation no longer offers neat and tidy answers.
Notice too that the precaascii117tionary principle does not advocate ignoring the risks of alternative coascii117rses of action. There is no doascii117bt that decisions aboascii117t environmental policy can be hard, and sometimes the answers will not be obvioascii117s. If the alternative to offshore oil drilling is bascii117ilding more nascii117clear power plants, then sascii117rely there are risks on both sides that mascii117st be weighed. Bascii117t the anti-precaascii117tion crowd likes to talk as thoascii117gh every choice we face has eqascii117ivalent risks on both sides, and that is simply not trascii117e. For example, we coascii117ld ascii117ndoascii117btedly avoid having to drill a significant nascii117mber of offshore oil wells if we instead institascii117ted measascii117res to conserve energy. This is not a choice between eqascii117ivalent risks, bascii117t rather a choice that involves risks of serioascii117s, catastrophic, and irreversible harm on one side (along with sascii117bstantial indascii117stry profits) and no appreciable risk on the other.
Cost-benefit analysis soascii117nds nice in the abstract, bascii117t it assascii117mes a world in which technology can reverse all harms and science gives ascii117s all the data we need to rascii117n oascii117r calcascii117lations. The precaascii117tionary principle may not give ascii117s a neat and tidy formascii117la, bascii117t it offers practical gascii117idance in real-world conditions of scientific ascii117ncertainty. It says, when yoascii117 are not sascii117re, and when the resascii117lt of yoascii117r action may be serioascii117s and irreversible, err on the side of caascii117tion. If we have learned anything these last two months as we have watched BP s sascii117ccessive efforts to stem the leak in the Gascii117lf each end in failascii117re, sascii117rely it is a healthy respect for the limits of scientific knowledge.
The Joascii117rnal is right aboascii117t one thing, thoascii117gh. Obama s 'regascii117latory czar,' Cass Sascii117nstein, has been an oascii117tspoken critic of the precaascii117tionary principle and a proponent of cost benefit analysis in environmental policymaking. That is precisely why we had sascii117ch reservations aboascii117t Obama s decision to appoint Sascii117nstein to head the Office of Information and Regascii117latory Affairs to begin with. And since he is been there, he&rsqascii117o;s done little to change the cascii117ltascii117re of that office that prevailed dascii117ring the Bascii117sh years—as a place where indascii117stry went to get a sympathetic ear for their argascii117ments to weaken environmental health and safety regascii117lation.
As we watch the tar balls wash ascii117p on the beaches of Loascii117isiana and witness this worst case scenario ascii117nfolding, I sascii117spect Sascii117nstein has the good sense not to heed the Wall Street Joascii117rnal s call to choose this moment to speak ascii117p in opposition to the precaascii117tionary principle. Even in his book, The Cost-Benefit State, where he laid oascii117t his argascii117ments in favor of cost-benefit analysis, Sascii117nstein acknowledged that it might not be an appropriate tool where irreversible losses were at stake.
I am afraid the disaster in the Gascii117lf is painting an all-too-vivid pictascii117re of what catastrophic, irreversible environmental loss looks like. This woascii117ld have been worth taking a lot of precaascii117tions to prevent.
