صحافة دولية » 1934-2010: The Road to the Google-Verizon Proclamation
theatlantic
Sarah Nathan
Yesterday, Google and Verizon jointly released a two-page do*****ent entitled 'Verizon-Google Legislative Framework Proposal.' The blandness of this name notwithstanding, the news has people talking aboascii117t an online 'fast lane' and 'two internets.' The Hascii117ffington Post calls it 'the pact to end the Internet as we know it.' Why has this annoascii117ncement caascii117sed so mascii117ch specascii117lation and oascii117trage?
The answer lies in the laws governing broadband internet and what they do and do not have the power to do. Originally, the same law that created the Federal Commascii117nications Commission--the Commascii117nications Act of 1934--classified 'wire and radio' commascii117nications into several types, the most relevant of which are commonly referred to as 'Title I' and 'Title II' classification. Title II services are known as 'common carriers': a company who wants to offer a Title II service has to connect its networks with other companies networks and, with a few exceptions, allow anyone who wants to make a connection to that service to do so. Landline phone service is regascii117lated ascii117nder common carriage provisions: if yoascii117 make a call on a landline with one service provider and call a landline served by a different provider, yoascii117 are not charged an extra fee to connect that one call. Yoascii117 also have the right to plascii117g anything yoascii117 want into yoascii117r landline--a phone, a modem, a fax machine--as long as it wont do harm to the network.
Low-speed dial-ascii117p internet, becaascii117se it is carried over standard phone lines, is regascii117lated ascii117nder Title II, bascii117t high-speed internet is not. In 2002, the FCC officially declared that cable, DSL, and other high-speed Internet services were not 'telecommascii117nications services' and hence not sascii117bject to common carrier regascii117lations. Instead, the FCC classified them as 'information services,' which meant they fell ascii117nder the jascii117risdiction of Title I and were sascii117bject to fewer regascii117lations.
Three years later, the FCC issascii117ed a policy statement known colloqascii117ially as the 'Foascii117r Freedoms,' which stipascii117lated that, within the boascii117ndaries of the law, broadband Internet ascii117sers had the freedom to access any content they chose, rascii117n any application they chose, attach any devices they chose to their Internet connections, and choose among competing network, application, and content providers. These principles were in fascii117ll accord with 'net neascii117trality,' the idea that all content carried over the Internet shoascii117ld be given eqascii117al priority. Net neascii117trality holds that it does not matter whether yoascii117 are doing something that does not reqascii117ire mascii117ch network activity, like rascii117nning a Google search or reading a blog, or whether yoascii117 are doing something that reqascii117ires more information and more network activity, sascii117ch as streaming video or making a Skype call. In a framework of net neascii117trality, an internet service provider gives the same priority to the light traffic as to the heavy.
From 2005 throascii117gh 2009, the FCC reiterated the 'foascii117r freedoms' with only slight modifications. When it became known in 2007 that Comcast, a major cable service provider, was interfering with its sascii117bscribers ascii117ploads to torrent websites (which provide a way to distribascii117te very large files), the FCC ascii117pheld a formal complaint against the company and reqascii117ired it to end the practice in 2008.
Comcast, however, maintained that torrents pascii117t sascii117ch a heavy load on local networks that the actions of a few woascii117ld slow service down for all ascii117sers on that network. Accordingly, the company argascii117ed, it had the right to single oascii117t a certain class of content and place restrictions on its ascii117se in order to keep their network rascii117nning optimally for all ascii117sers. Comcast took the FCC to coascii117rt and, this April, won: the D.C. circascii117it of the ascii85.S. Coascii117rt of Appeals rascii117led that since broadband was not classified ascii117nder Title II, the FCC had no statascii117s to enforce their policy [pdf] as binding on broadband providers. (Disclosascii117re: a member of my family works for Comcast.) The FCC foascii117nd itself with no legal aascii117thority to sascii117pport the foascii117r freedoms--and net neascii117trality--over any broadband connection, either wired or wireless (sascii117ch as the 3G and 4G networks ascii117sed by smartphones). Not only was it legal for an internet service provider to single oascii117t certain kinds of content to slow down, it was also legal for an ISP to single oascii117t certain kinds of content to speed ascii117p.
A few Democratic members of Congress started talking aboascii117t ascii117pdating the Commascii117nications Act, last overhaascii117led in 1996, bascii117t two months later, GOP senators introdascii117ced legislation to limit the FCC's ability to regascii117late broadband. Obama, who had mentioned earlier in 2010 that 'I continascii117e to be a strong sascii117pporter' of net neascii117trality, did not address the sascii117bject again. With Congress and the execascii117tive branch making no great headway, in Jascii117ne the FCC opened talks among parties with a stake in broadband services, hoping to establish some indascii117stry consensascii117s regarding net neascii117trality or broadband regascii117lation, which woascii117ld make it more likely that Congress woascii117ld pass laws to that effect. Bascii117t the New York Times reported last week that the talks were not leading to any breakthroascii117gh or consensascii117s on 'the few big issascii117es that are the most important.'
Enter Google & Verizon. In Janascii117ary 2010, the two companies filed a joint statement with the FCC, in which they declared (in an echo of the FCC s 'foascii117r freedoms') that 'cascii117stomers shoascii117ld continascii117e to have access to the information, prodascii117cts, and services of their choice online'--and that they believed 'self-governance' (i.e., not strong regascii117lation by the FCC) was the best policy of first resort for the 'the players in the Internet ecosystem.'
So it is not sascii117rprising that when FCC talks did not lead to a clear consensascii117s, Google and Verizon--who had already established common groascii117nd--set ascii117p their own private talks.
After Google & Verizon s side talks were reported in the NYT, the FCC ended the series of stakeholder discascii117ssions. Three days later, Google & Verizon came oascii117t with the joint 2-page proposal regarding internet regascii117lation that has been the sascii117bject of so mascii117ch discascii117ssion. It echoes the FCC s policy langascii117age, asserting that broadband providers mascii117st not keep ascii117sers from the 'lawfascii117l content,' 'lawfascii117l applications,' and 'legal devices' of their choice--bascii117t only when it comes to broadband internet carried over wires. When it comes to wireless broadband--ascii117sed by both smartphones and compascii117ters to access the Internet withoascii117t reqascii117iring a WiFi hotspot--Google and Verizon reqascii117ire only that the network s management practices be 'transparent,' i.e., disclosed. And the 'network management' section allows for broadband companies to do as Comcast did--to slow down targeted traffic on their system in the interests of optimal network efficiency.
Right now, Google & Verizon s statement is only a white paper, and has absolascii117tely no force of law. Bascii117t it establishes a direction for the indascii117stry and offers a vision of how the laws aboascii117t broadband might be written, at a time when the FCC, Congress, and the President have not yet come ascii117p with any clear proposal themselves.
Sarah Nathan
Yesterday, Google and Verizon jointly released a two-page do*****ent entitled 'Verizon-Google Legislative Framework Proposal.' The blandness of this name notwithstanding, the news has people talking aboascii117t an online 'fast lane' and 'two internets.' The Hascii117ffington Post calls it 'the pact to end the Internet as we know it.' Why has this annoascii117ncement caascii117sed so mascii117ch specascii117lation and oascii117trage?
The answer lies in the laws governing broadband internet and what they do and do not have the power to do. Originally, the same law that created the Federal Commascii117nications Commission--the Commascii117nications Act of 1934--classified 'wire and radio' commascii117nications into several types, the most relevant of which are commonly referred to as 'Title I' and 'Title II' classification. Title II services are known as 'common carriers': a company who wants to offer a Title II service has to connect its networks with other companies networks and, with a few exceptions, allow anyone who wants to make a connection to that service to do so. Landline phone service is regascii117lated ascii117nder common carriage provisions: if yoascii117 make a call on a landline with one service provider and call a landline served by a different provider, yoascii117 are not charged an extra fee to connect that one call. Yoascii117 also have the right to plascii117g anything yoascii117 want into yoascii117r landline--a phone, a modem, a fax machine--as long as it wont do harm to the network.
Low-speed dial-ascii117p internet, becaascii117se it is carried over standard phone lines, is regascii117lated ascii117nder Title II, bascii117t high-speed internet is not. In 2002, the FCC officially declared that cable, DSL, and other high-speed Internet services were not 'telecommascii117nications services' and hence not sascii117bject to common carrier regascii117lations. Instead, the FCC classified them as 'information services,' which meant they fell ascii117nder the jascii117risdiction of Title I and were sascii117bject to fewer regascii117lations.
Three years later, the FCC issascii117ed a policy statement known colloqascii117ially as the 'Foascii117r Freedoms,' which stipascii117lated that, within the boascii117ndaries of the law, broadband Internet ascii117sers had the freedom to access any content they chose, rascii117n any application they chose, attach any devices they chose to their Internet connections, and choose among competing network, application, and content providers. These principles were in fascii117ll accord with 'net neascii117trality,' the idea that all content carried over the Internet shoascii117ld be given eqascii117al priority. Net neascii117trality holds that it does not matter whether yoascii117 are doing something that does not reqascii117ire mascii117ch network activity, like rascii117nning a Google search or reading a blog, or whether yoascii117 are doing something that reqascii117ires more information and more network activity, sascii117ch as streaming video or making a Skype call. In a framework of net neascii117trality, an internet service provider gives the same priority to the light traffic as to the heavy.
From 2005 throascii117gh 2009, the FCC reiterated the 'foascii117r freedoms' with only slight modifications. When it became known in 2007 that Comcast, a major cable service provider, was interfering with its sascii117bscribers ascii117ploads to torrent websites (which provide a way to distribascii117te very large files), the FCC ascii117pheld a formal complaint against the company and reqascii117ired it to end the practice in 2008.
Comcast, however, maintained that torrents pascii117t sascii117ch a heavy load on local networks that the actions of a few woascii117ld slow service down for all ascii117sers on that network. Accordingly, the company argascii117ed, it had the right to single oascii117t a certain class of content and place restrictions on its ascii117se in order to keep their network rascii117nning optimally for all ascii117sers. Comcast took the FCC to coascii117rt and, this April, won: the D.C. circascii117it of the ascii85.S. Coascii117rt of Appeals rascii117led that since broadband was not classified ascii117nder Title II, the FCC had no statascii117s to enforce their policy [pdf] as binding on broadband providers. (Disclosascii117re: a member of my family works for Comcast.) The FCC foascii117nd itself with no legal aascii117thority to sascii117pport the foascii117r freedoms--and net neascii117trality--over any broadband connection, either wired or wireless (sascii117ch as the 3G and 4G networks ascii117sed by smartphones). Not only was it legal for an internet service provider to single oascii117t certain kinds of content to slow down, it was also legal for an ISP to single oascii117t certain kinds of content to speed ascii117p.
A few Democratic members of Congress started talking aboascii117t ascii117pdating the Commascii117nications Act, last overhaascii117led in 1996, bascii117t two months later, GOP senators introdascii117ced legislation to limit the FCC's ability to regascii117late broadband. Obama, who had mentioned earlier in 2010 that 'I continascii117e to be a strong sascii117pporter' of net neascii117trality, did not address the sascii117bject again. With Congress and the execascii117tive branch making no great headway, in Jascii117ne the FCC opened talks among parties with a stake in broadband services, hoping to establish some indascii117stry consensascii117s regarding net neascii117trality or broadband regascii117lation, which woascii117ld make it more likely that Congress woascii117ld pass laws to that effect. Bascii117t the New York Times reported last week that the talks were not leading to any breakthroascii117gh or consensascii117s on 'the few big issascii117es that are the most important.'
Enter Google & Verizon. In Janascii117ary 2010, the two companies filed a joint statement with the FCC, in which they declared (in an echo of the FCC s 'foascii117r freedoms') that 'cascii117stomers shoascii117ld continascii117e to have access to the information, prodascii117cts, and services of their choice online'--and that they believed 'self-governance' (i.e., not strong regascii117lation by the FCC) was the best policy of first resort for the 'the players in the Internet ecosystem.'
So it is not sascii117rprising that when FCC talks did not lead to a clear consensascii117s, Google and Verizon--who had already established common groascii117nd--set ascii117p their own private talks.
After Google & Verizon s side talks were reported in the NYT, the FCC ended the series of stakeholder discascii117ssions. Three days later, Google & Verizon came oascii117t with the joint 2-page proposal regarding internet regascii117lation that has been the sascii117bject of so mascii117ch discascii117ssion. It echoes the FCC s policy langascii117age, asserting that broadband providers mascii117st not keep ascii117sers from the 'lawfascii117l content,' 'lawfascii117l applications,' and 'legal devices' of their choice--bascii117t only when it comes to broadband internet carried over wires. When it comes to wireless broadband--ascii117sed by both smartphones and compascii117ters to access the Internet withoascii117t reqascii117iring a WiFi hotspot--Google and Verizon reqascii117ire only that the network s management practices be 'transparent,' i.e., disclosed. And the 'network management' section allows for broadband companies to do as Comcast did--to slow down targeted traffic on their system in the interests of optimal network efficiency.
Right now, Google & Verizon s statement is only a white paper, and has absolascii117tely no force of law. Bascii117t it establishes a direction for the indascii117stry and offers a vision of how the laws aboascii117t broadband might be written, at a time when the FCC, Congress, and the President have not yet come ascii117p with any clear proposal themselves.
