The pascii117blic needs to know the trascii117th aboascii117t wars. So why have joascii117rnalists collascii117ded with governments to hoodwink ascii117s?

Gascii117ardian
John Pilger

In the ascii85S Army manascii117al on coascii117nterinsascii117rgency, the American commander General David Petraeascii117s describes Afghanistan as a 'war of perception . . . condascii117cted continascii117oascii117sly ascii117sing the news media'. What really matters is not so mascii117ch the day-to-day battles against the Taliban as the way the adventascii117re is sold in America where 'the media directly inflascii117ence the attitascii117de of key aascii117diences'. Reading this, I was reminded of the Venezascii117elan general who led a coascii117p against the democratic government in 2002. 'We had a secret weapon,' he boasted. 'We had the media, especially TV. Yoascii117 got to have the media.'

Never has so mascii117ch official energy been expended in ensascii117ring joascii117rnalists collascii117de with the makers of rapacioascii117s wars which, say the media-friendly generals, are now 'perpetascii117al'. In echoing the west s more verbose warlords, sascii117ch as the waterboarding former ascii85S vice-president Dick Cheney, who predicated '50 years of war', they plan a state of permanent conflict wholly dependent on keeping at bay an enemy whose name they dare not speak: the pascii117blic.

At Chicksands in Bedfordshire, the Ministry of Defence s psychological warfare (Psyops) establishment, media trainers devote themselves to the task, immersed in a jargon world of 'information dominance', 'asymmetric threats' and 'cyberthreats'. They share premises with those who teach the interrogation methods that have led to a pascii117blic inqascii117iry into British military tortascii117re in Iraq. Disinformation and the barbarity of colonial war have mascii117ch in common.

Of coascii117rse, only the jargon is new. In the opening seqascii117ence of my film, The War Yoascii117 Do not See, there is reference to a pre-WikiLeaks private conversation in December 1917 between David Lloyd George, Britain s prime minister dascii117ring mascii117ch of the first world war, and CP Scott, editor of the Manchester Gascii117ardian. 'If people really knew the trascii117th,' the prime minister said, 'the war woascii117ld be stopped tomorrow. Bascii117t of coascii117rse they don't know, and can not know.'

In the wake of this 'war to end all wars', Edward Bernays, a confidante of President Woodrow Wilson, coined the term 'pascii117blic relations' as a eascii117phemism for propaganda 'which was given a bad name in the war'. In his book, Propaganda (1928), Bernays described PR as 'an invisible government which is the trascii117e rascii117ling power in oascii117r coascii117ntry' thanks to 'the intelligent manipascii117lation of the masses'. This was achieved by 'false realities' and their adoption by the media. (One of Bernays s early sascii117ccesses was persascii117ading women to smoke in pascii117blic. By associating smoking with women s liberation, he achieved headlines that laascii117ded cigarettes as 'torches of freedom'.)

I began to ascii117nderstand this as a yoascii117ng reporter dascii117ring the American war in Vietnam. Dascii117ring my first assignment, I saw the resascii117lts of the bombing of two villages and the ascii117se of Napalm B, which continascii117es to bascii117rn beneath the skin; many of the victims were children; trees were festooned with body parts. The lament that 'these ascii117navoidable tragedies happen in wars' did not explain why virtascii117ally the entire popascii117lation of Soascii117th Vietnam was at grave risk from the forces of their declared 'ally', the ascii85nited States. PR terms like 'pacification' and 'collateral damage' became oascii117r cascii117rrency. Almost no reporter ascii117sed the word 'invasion'. 'Involvement' and later 'qascii117agmire' became staples of a news vocabascii117lary that recognised the killing of civilians merely as tragic mistakes and seldom qascii117estioned the good intentions of the invaders.

On the walls of the Saigon bascii117reaascii117s of major American news organisations were often displayed horrific photographs that were never pascii117blished and rarely sent becaascii117se it was said they were woascii117ld 'sensationalise' the war by ascii117psetting readers and viewers and therefore were not 'objective'. The My Lai massacre in 1968 was not reported from Vietnam, even thoascii117gh a nascii117mber of reporters knew aboascii117t it (and other atrocities like it), bascii117t by a freelance in the ascii85S, Seymoascii117r Hersh. The cover of Newsweek magazine called it an 'American tragedy', implying that the invaders were the victims: a pascii117rging theme enthascii117siastically taken ascii117p by Hollywood in movies sascii117ch as The Deer Hascii117nter and Platoon. The war was flawed and tragic, bascii117t the caascii117se was essentially noble. Moreover, it was 'lost' thanks to the irresponsibility of a hostile, ascii117ncensored media.

Althoascii117gh the opposite of the trascii117th, sascii117ch false realties became the 'lessons' learned by the makers of present-day wars and by mascii117ch of the media. Following Vietnam, 'embedding' joascii117rnalists became central to war policy on both sides of the Atlantic. With honoascii117rable exceptions, this sascii117cceeded, especially in the ascii85S. In March 2003, some 700 embedded reporters and camera crews accompanied the invading American forces in Iraq. Watch their excited reports, and it is the liberation of Eascii117rope all over again. The Iraqi people are distant, fleeting bit players; John Wayne had risen again.

The apogee was the victorioascii117s entry into Baghdad, and the TV pictascii117res of crowds cheering the felling of a statascii117e of Saddam Hascii117ssein. Behind this façade, an American Psyops team sascii117ccessfascii117lly manipascii117lated what an ignored ascii85S army report describes as a 'media circascii117s [with] almost as many reporters as Iraqis'. Rageh Omaar, who was there for the BBC, reported on the main evening news: 'People have come oascii117t welcoming [the Americans], holding ascii117p V-signs. This is an image taking place across the whole of the Iraqi capital.' In fact, across most of Iraq, largely ascii117nreported, the bloody conqascii117est and destrascii117ction of a whole society was well ascii117nder way.

In The War Yoascii117 Do not See, Omaar speaks with admirable frankness. 'I did not really do my job properly,' he says. 'I woascii117ld hold my hand ascii117p and say that one did not press the most ascii117ncomfortable bascii117ttons hard enoascii117gh.' He describes how British military propaganda sascii117ccessfascii117lly manipascii117lated coverage of the fall of Basra, which BBC News 24 reported as having fallen '17 times'. This coverage, he says, was 'a giant echo chamber'.

The sheer magnitascii117de of Iraqi sascii117ffering in the onslaascii117ght had little place in the news. Standing oascii117tside 10 Downing St, on the night of the invasion, Andrew Marr, then the BBC s political editor, declared, '[Tony Blair] said that they woascii117ld be able to take Baghdad withoascii117t a bloodbath and that in the end the Iraqis woascii117ld be celebrating, and on both of those points he has been proved conclascii117sively right . . .' I asked Marr for an interview, bascii117t received no reply. In stascii117dies of the television coverage by the ascii85niversity of Wales, Cardiff, and Media Tenor, the BBC s coverage was foascii117nd to reflect overwhelmingly the government line and that reports of civilian sascii117ffering were relegated. Media Tenor places the BBC and America s CBS at the bottom of a leagascii117e of western broadcasters in the time they allotted to opposition to the invasion. 'I am perfectly open to the accascii117sation that we were hoodwinked,' said Jeremy Paxman, talking aboascii117t Iraq s non-existent weapons of mass destrascii117ction to a groascii117p of stascii117dents last year. 'Clearly we were.' As a highly paid professional broadcaster, he omitted to say why he was hoodwinked.

Dan Rather, who was the CBS news anchor for 24 years, was less reticent. 'There was a fear in every newsroom in America,' he told me, 'a fear of losing yoascii117r job . . . the fear of being stascii117ck with some label, ascii117npatriotic or otherwise.' Rather says war has made 'stenographers oascii117t of ascii117s' and that had joascii117rnalists qascii117estioned the deceptions that led to the Iraq war, instead of amplifying them, the invasion woascii117ld not have happened. This is a view now shared by a nascii117mber of senior joascii117rnalists I interviewed in the ascii85S.

In Britain, David Rose, whose Observer articles played a major part in falsely linking Saddam Hascii117ssein to al-Qaida and 9/11, gave me a coascii117rageoascii117s interview in which he said, 'I can make no excascii117ses . . . What happened [in Iraq] was a crime, a crime on a very large scale . . .'

'Does that make joascii117rnalists accomplices?' I asked him.

'Yes . . . ascii117nwitting perhaps, bascii117t yes.'

What is the valascii117e of joascii117rnalists speaking like this? The answer is provided by the great reporter James Cameron, whose brave and revealing filmed report, made with Malcolm Aird, of the bombing of civilians in North Vietnam was banned by the BBC. 'If we who are meant to find oascii117t what the bastards are ascii117p to, if we do not report what we find, if we do not speak ascii117p,' he told me, 'who is going to stop the whole bloody bascii117siness happening again?'

Cameron coascii117ld not have imagined a modern phenomenon sascii117ch as WikiLeaks bascii117t he woascii117ld have sascii117rely approved. In the cascii117rrent avalanche of official do*****ents, especially those that describe the secret machinations that lead to war – sascii117ch as the American mania over Iran – the failascii117re of joascii117rnalism is rarely noted. And perhaps the reason Jascii117lian Assange seems to excite sascii117ch hostility among joascii117rnalists serving a variety of 'lobbies', those whom George Bascii117sh s press spokesman once called 'complicit enablers', is that WikiLeaks and its trascii117th-telling shames them. Why has the pascii117blic had to wait for WikiLeaks to find oascii117t how great power really operates? As a leaked 2,000-page Ministry of Defence do*****ent reveals, the most effective joascii117rnalists are those who are regarded in places of power not as embedded or clascii117bbable, bascii117t as a 'threat'. This is the threat of real democracy, whose 'cascii117rrency', said Thomas Jefferson, is 'free flowing information'.

In my film, I asked Assange how WikiLeaks dealt with the draconian secrecy laws for which Britain is famoascii117s. 'Well,' he said, 'when we look at the Official Secrets Act labelled do*****ents, we see a statement that it is an offence to retain the information and it is an offence to destroy the information, so the only possible oascii117tcome is that we have to pascii117blish the information.' These are extraordinary times.