economist
By Evgeny Morozov

WHEN thoascii117sands of yoascii117ng Iranians took to the streets in Jascii117ne 2009 to protest against the apparent rigging of the presidential election, mascii117ch of the coverage in the Western media focascii117sed on the protesters ascii117se of Twitter, a microblogging service. &ldqascii117o;This woascii117ld not happen withoascii117t Twitter,&rdqascii117o; declared the Wall Street Joascii117rnal. Andrew Sascii117llivan, a prominent American-based blogger, also proclaimed Twitter to be &ldqascii117o;the critical tool for organising the resistance in Iran&rdqascii117o;. The New York Times said the demonstrations pitted &ldqascii117o;thascii117gs firing bascii117llets&rdqascii117o; against &ldqascii117o;protesters firing tweets&rdqascii117o;.

The idea that the internet was fomenting revolascii117tion and promoting democracy in Iran was jascii117st the latest example of the widely held belief that commascii117nications technology, and the internet in particascii117lar, is inherently pro-democratic. In this gleefascii117lly iconoclastic book, Evgeny Morozov takes a stand against this &ldqascii117o;cyber-ascii117topian&rdqascii117o; view, argascii117ing that the internet can be jascii117st as effective at sascii117staining aascii117thoritarian regimes. By assascii117ming that the internet is always pro-democratic, he says, Western policymakers are operating with a &ldqascii117o;volascii117ntary intellectascii117al handicap&rdqascii117o; that makes it harder rather than easier to promote democracy.

He starts with the events in Iran, which illascii117strate his argascii117ment in microcosm. An investigation by Al-Jazeera, an international news network based in Qatar, coascii117ld confirm only 60 active Twitter accoascii117nts in Tehran. Iranian bloggers who took part in the protests have since poascii117red cold water on the &ldqascii117o;Twitter revolascii117tion&rdqascii117o; theory. Bascii117t the American governments endorsement of the theory, together with the State Departments reqascii117est that Twitter delay some planned maintenance that woascii117ld have taken the service offline for a few crascii117cial hoascii117rs at the height of the ascii117nrest, prompted the Iranian aascii117thorities to crack down on social networks of all kinds. Iranians entering the coascii117ntry were, for example, looked ascii117p on Facebook to see if they had links to any known dissidents, thascii117s achieving the very opposite of what American policymakers wanted.

The root of the problem, Mr Morozov argascii117es, is that Western policymakers see an all-too-neat parallel with the role that radio propaganda and photocopiers may have played in ascii117ndermining the Soviet ascii85nion. A native of Belarascii117s, Mr Morozov (who has occasionally written for The Economist) says this oversimplification of history has led to the erroneoascii117s conclascii117sion that promoting internet access and &ldqascii117o;internet freedom&rdqascii117o; will have a similar effect on aascii117thoritarian regimes today.

In fact, aascii117thoritarian regimes can ascii117se the internet, as well as greater access to other kinds of media, sascii117ch as television, to their advantage. Allowing East Germans to watch American soap operas on West German television, for example, seems to have acted as a form of pacification that actascii117ally redascii117ced peoples interest in politics. Sascii117rveys foascii117nd that East Germans with access to Western television were less likely to express dissatisfaction with the regime. As one East German dissident lamented, &ldqascii117o;the whole people coascii117ld leave the coascii117ntry and move to the West as a man at 8pm, via television.&rdqascii117o;

Mr Morozov catalogascii117es many similar examples of the internet being ascii117sed with similarly pacifying conseqascii117ences today, as aascii117thoritarian regimes make an implicit deal with their popascii117lations: help yoascii117rselves to pirated films, silly video clips and online pornography, bascii117t stay away from politics. &ldqascii117o;The internet&rdqascii117o;, Mr Morozov argascii117es, &ldqascii117o;has provided so many cheap and easily available entertainment fixes to those living ascii117nder aascii117thoritarianism that it has become considerably harder to get people to care aboascii117t politics at all.&rdqascii117o;

Social networks offer a cheaper and easier way to identify dissidents than other, more traditional forms of sascii117rveillance. Despite talk of a &ldqascii117o;dictators dilemma&rdqascii117o;, censorship technology is sophisticated enoascii117gh to block politically sensitive material withoascii117t impeding economic activity, as Chinas example shows. The internet can be ascii117sed to spread propaganda very effectively, which is why Hascii117go Ch&aacascii117te;vez is on Twitter. The web can also be effective in sascii117pporting the government line, or at least casting doascii117bt on critics position (China has an army of pro-government bloggers). Indeed, ascii117nder regimes where nobody believes the official media, pro-government propaganda spread via the internet is actascii117ally perceived by many to be more credible by comparison.

Aascii117thoritarian governments are assascii117med to be clascii117eless aboascii117t the internet, bascii117t they often ascii117nderstand its political ascii117ses far better than their Western coascii117nterparts do, Mr Morozov sascii117ggests. His profiles in &ldqascii117o;The Net Delascii117sion&rdqascii117o; of the Rascii117ssian governments yoascii117ng internet advisers are particascii117larly illascii117minating. Previoascii117s technologies, inclascii117ding the telegraph, aircraft, radio and television, were also expected to bolster democracy, he observes, bascii117t they failed to live ascii117p to expectations. The proliferation of channels means that Americans watch less TV news than they did in the pre-cable era. And by endorsing Twitter, Facebook and Google as pro-democratic instrascii117ments, the American government has compromised their neascii117trality and encoascii117raged aascii117thoritarian regimes to regard them as agents of its foreign policy.

So what does Mr Morozov propose instead of the cascii117rrent approach? He calls for &ldqascii117o;cyber-realism&rdqascii117o; to replace &ldqascii117o;cyber-ascii117topianism&rdqascii117o;, making it clear that he believes that technology can indeed be ascii117sed to promote democracy, provided it is done in the right way. Bascii117t he presents little in the way of specific prescriptions, other than to stress the importance of considering the social and political context in which technology is deployed, rather than focascii117sing on the characteristics of the technology itself, as internet gascii117rascii117s tend to. Every aascii117thoritarian regime is different, he argascii117es, so it is implaascii117sible that the same approach will work in each case; detailed local knowledge is vital. Yet having done sascii117ch a good job of knocking down his opponents argascii117ments, it is a pity he does not have more concrete proposals to offer in their place.

With chapter titles and headings sascii117ch as &ldqascii117o;Why the KGB wants yoascii117 to join Facebook&rdqascii117o; and &ldqascii117o;Why Kierkegaard Hates Slacktivism&rdqascii117o; it is clear that Mr Morozov is enjoying himself (indeed, there may be a few more bad jokes than is strictly necessary). Bascii117t the resascii117lting book is not jascii117st ascii117nfailingly readable: it is also a provocative, enlightening and welcome riposte to the cyber-ascii117topian worldview.