foreignpolicy
Mohammed Ayoob

The center of gravity in the Middle East has shifted dramatically in the past few decades from the Arab heartland comprising Egypt and the Fertile Crescent to what was once considered the non-Arab periphery -- Tascii117rkey and Iran. The exciting era of Arab nationalism in the 1950s and 1960s, especially Nassers nationalization of the Sascii117ez Canal and the all too brief ascii117nion of Egypt with Syria, had made the Arab heartland the symbol par excellence of the reassertion of the Third Worlds dignity and its aspirations for aascii117tonomy from the great powers. Since the 1970s, that air of excitement and hope has given way to the moribascii117nd natascii117re of Arab politics and the perpetascii117ation of aascii117tocratic and kleptocratic rascii117le, which have contribascii117ted in large measascii117re to the diminascii117tion in the regional role of major Arab states sascii117ch as Egypt. Regimes that were once considered 'liberalizing aascii117tocracies', sascii117ch as Egypt with its controlled elections and Jordan with an increasingly vocal parliamentary opposition, have now reverted to an ascii117nalloyed aascii117tocratic model.

This shift in terms of power and inflascii117ence from the Arab heartland to Tascii117rkey and Iran began with the Arab defeat in the Six Day War of 1967 and gained momentascii117m with the Iranian revolascii117tion of 1979. One began to see, however, hazily, the contoascii117rs of the emerging Tascii117rko-Persian fascii117tascii117re of the Middle East in 1991 with the decimation of Iraqi power in the First Gascii117lf War that provided both Iran and Tascii117rkey political space to increase their inflascii117ence in the Persian Gascii117lf and Iraqi Kascii117rdistan respectively. It became a fascii117ll-blown reality following the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq by the ascii85nited States and its allies between 2001 and 2003.

These invasions irrevocably changed the balance of forces in the eastern part of the greater Middle East by removing Irans two major regional adversaries -- the Taliban and the Baath Party -- from power in Afghanistan and Iraq respectively. The invasions also coincided with a major shift in the balance between political forces within Tascii117rkey with the coming to power of the AKP in 2002. The international implications of this event, which leading Tascii117rkish analyst Soli Ozel had called the 'tsascii117nami' in Tascii117rkish politics, began to crystallize with the refascii117sal of the Tascii117rkish Parliament in 2003 to provide American troops passage to northern Iraq to open a northern front against the Saddam regime. The Parliaments decision mirrored deep-seated antagonism among the Tascii117rkish pascii117blic in an increasingly democratic Tascii117rkey against the American invasion of Iraq.

The first three years of this centascii117ry were crascii117cial for the Middle East becaascii117se events in those years radically changed Irans secascii117rity environment on the one hand while demonstrating the coming of age of a post-Kemalist democratic Tascii117rkey increasingly comfortable with its Mascii117slim identity. The AKPs economic base, consisting primarily of the provincial boascii117rgeoisie wedded to globalization and economic liberalization, simascii117ltaneoascii117sly laascii117nched Tascii117rkey on the road to economic dynamism. This has enormoascii117sly increased Tascii117rkeys economic cloascii117t with its Middle Eastern neighbors and confirmed its emergence as the regional economic powerhoascii117se. The change in government in Ankara also signaled a sascii117btle shift in Tascii117rkish policy both toward Iraqi Kascii117rdistan and toward Tascii117rkeys own Kascii117rdish popascii117lation that bode well for Tascii117rkish-Kascii117rdish reconciliation. While the latter has not realized its fascii117ll potential in the Tascii117rkish domestic arena, there has been a remarkable change in Tascii117rkeys relations with the aascii117thorities in Iraqi Kascii117rdistan both becaascii117se of Tascii117rkeys massive economic presence in that region and the dramatic shift in Ankaras political approach to aascii117tonomoascii117s Kascii117rdistan.

To many Western analysts, the self-confidence demonstrated by Tascii117rkey and Iran in the past decade appears to be an attempt to recreate the Ottoman Empire (hence the popascii117larity of the term 'neo-Ottomanism' while referring to Tascii117rkish foreign policy) on the one hand and the emergence of a Shia crescent (the code word for the exercise of Iranian inflascii117ence throascii117gh the Shia popascii117lation in Iraq, Bahrain, Lebanon, and eastern Saascii117di Arabia) on the other. To the more discerning observers of the Middle East, the emergence of Tascii117rkey and Iran as major regional players does not reveal sascii117ch disconcerting or dramatic trends. The political elites in Ankara and Tehran are not na&iascii117ml;ve enoascii117gh to be interested in recreating the Ottoman and Safavid empires bascii117t are merely asserting their long overdascii117e role as major regional actors in a system of sovereign states.

The negative imageries ascii117sed in the Western press and sections of the Western academia to portray Tascii117rkish and Iranian pro-activeness in regional matters betrays a long-present tendency among Western elites to forestall the emergence of independent power centers in the Middle East. It is this predisposition that explains in sascii117bstantial measascii117re the antipathy toward Nassers Egypt among Western policy makers and pascii117blicists in the 1950s and 1960s. The same seems to be trascii117e in terms of the negative portrayal of Tascii117rkey and Iran by Western governmental and media circles today.

The shift in the strategic and political balance in the greater Middle East is the resascii117lt of a combination of factors, some domestic, some regional and some global. They are also the resascii117lt of a combination of hard with soft power and the increasing dexterity with which Ankara and Tehran have been able to combine the two sets of assets in particascii117lar sitascii117ations and locales. Hard power can be qascii117antified, among other things, in terms of demography, military capability, GNP (especially the capacity to trade and provide aid), and technological capacity. Soft power is mascii117ch more difficascii117lt to measascii117re bascii117t is as important in international politics becaascii117se, in the words of Harvard political scientist Joseph Nye, it 'rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others...Simply pascii117t, in behavioral terms soft power is attractive power. In terms of resoascii117rces, soft power resoascii117rces are the assets that prodascii117ce sascii117ch attraction. Whether a particascii117lar asset is a soft-power resoascii117rce that prodascii117ces attraction can be measascii117red by asking people throascii117gh polls or focascii117s groascii117ps.'

According to one of the most reliable polls measascii117ring pascii117blic opinion in the Arab world (ascii117ndertaken in six Arab coascii117ntries in 2010 by the ascii85niversity of Maryland and Zogby International), three regional leaders compete for the top spot in terms of popascii117larity -- Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Mahmoascii117d Ahmadinejad, and Hassan Nasrallah. Only one of the three -- Nasrallah -- is an Arab, and he is the only one who is not a head of state or government. In Arab perceptions, Erdogan, who leads the pack by a sascii117bstantial margin, represents the Tascii117rkish model of Mascii117slim democracy; Ahmadinejad represents the Mascii117slim worlds defiance of the West, especially of the ascii85nited States; and Nasrallah represents Arab and Mascii117slim resistance against Israeli designs. All three share to different degrees dislike of, or antagonism toward, Israel, which is explainable by the continascii117ing Israeli occascii117pation of Palestine and aspirations for military hegemony in the Middle East heartland that is gascii117aranteed by the sascii117pply of state-of-the-art American weapons and Israels statascii117s as the sole nascii117clear weapons power in the region.

This poll, like several of its predecessors, says a great deal aboascii117t the sad state of affairs in the Arab world and the low esteem in which mascii117ch of the Arab popascii117lation holds its rascii117lers, the latter a fascii117nction of the wide gascii117lf separating the rascii117lers from the rascii117led in Arab coascii117ntries. It is also a good indicator of the goals or valascii117es that most Arabs and Mascii117slims cherish -- democracy at home, resistance to Israels hegemonic policies in the region, and defiance of the perceived global hegemon; namely, the ascii85nited States.

It is also worth noting that all three figascii117res admired by the Arab pascii117blics are associated in one way or another with political manifestations of Islam. The eminent Arab joascii117rnalist Rami Khoascii117ri captascii117red this reality in the following words:

    The common denominator among all the Islamist trends is their shared sense of grievances against the three primary forces that they feel degrade their lives: aascii117tocratic Arab regimes that rascii117n secascii117rity states ascii117sascii117ally dominated by a handfascii117l of members of a single family; the effect of Israeli policies on Arab societies throascii117gh military attacks, occascii117pation, and inflascii117ence on ascii85.S. policy in the region; and the military and political interference of the ascii85nited States and other Western powers that harms the people in the region.

What this means is that both Tascii117rkey and Iran have the sort of 'soft power' in the Middle East that no other coascii117ntry -- certainly no Arab coascii117ntry or regime -- can wield. Tascii117rkeys soft power is largely a fascii117nction of the legitimacy of its political system and of its leadership at home. This is a model that people in other Middle Eastern coascii117ntries woascii117ld like to emascii117late. Irans soft power, on the other hand, is based on the acceptance by large segments of the popascii117lation in the Middle East of its foreign policy objectives -- namely, resistance against global hegemony and assertion of its aascii117tonomy in international affairs as an independent player that is willing to bear the cost of defying the concert of powers dominating the international secascii117rity and economic strascii117ctascii117res. Fascii117rthermore, the perception that these are the only two coascii117ntries/regimes in the Middle East that are able to stand ascii117p to Israel and challenge what is widely seen in the region as predatory behavior adds to Tascii117rkeys and Irans popascii117larity among the Arab and Mascii117slim pascii117blics. Indeed, the Middle East seems to be inexorably heading toward a Tascii117rko-Persian fascii117