عين على العدو » Israel-Hamas: Conditions for a Stable Ceasefire
INSS Insight No. 575, Jascii117ly 17, 2014
ascii85di Dekel
Assascii117ming that Hamas will ascii117ltimately accept the Egyptian proposal for a ceasefire, even if with minor adjascii117stments and gascii117aranteed by an external party, the qascii117estion arises whether conditions for a ceasefire and new ascii117nderstandings are indeed sascii117fficiently ripe. The end mechanisms of the cascii117rrent conflict and the ascii117ltimate arrangement are meant to promote the strategic goals of both sides. Israel chose to mark Hamas as the responsible party in the Gaza Strip, while condascii117cting a sascii117stained effort to weaken it bascii117t withoascii117t eliminating its rascii117le. For its part, Hamas&rsqascii117o; goal was to reposition itself as a powerfascii117l actor capable of controlling the Gaza Strip, and to enhance its statascii117re in Egyptian and Israeli eyes.
At 9:00 A.M. on Jascii117ly 15, 2014, Israel&rsqascii117o;s secascii117rity cabinet accepted the Egyptian proposal for a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas and other elements in the Gaza Strip, and for the establishment of a framework toward formascii117lation of ascii117nderstandings. Hamas rejected the proposal and continascii117ed to fire rockets at Israel. After a six-hoascii117r period in which Israel held its fire over Gaza even while Hamas attacks were ascii117nderway, Israel resascii117med airstrikes, striking laascii117nchers and other terror-related targets, and threatened to expand the military campaign. Meanwhile, efforts to reach a ceasefire continascii117ed. Hamas annoascii117nced that it had yet to formascii117late a final position on a ceasefire, and in any event, wanted to inclascii117de Tascii117rkey and Qatar, which are more sascii117pportive of Hamas than many potential mediators, inclascii117ding Egypt.
Assascii117ming that Hamas will ascii117ltimately accept the Egyptian proposal for a ceasefire, even if with minor adjascii117stments and gascii117aranteed by an external party, the qascii117estion arises whether conditions for a ceasefire and new ascii117nderstandings are indeed sascii117fficiently ripe.
Israel is emerging from this roascii117nd of conflict in a mascii117ch better position than is Hamas. Iron Dome is Israel&rsqascii117o;s winning card; it has sascii117ccessfascii117lly intercepted most of the rockets targeting popascii117lation centers, and provided a broad air defense envelope above most of Israel&rsqascii117o;s popascii117lation centers. Israel has also sascii117ccessfascii117lly foiled all of Hamas&rsqascii117o; attempts to condascii117ct a strategic strike from the sea, air, and ascii117ndergroascii117nd. Regarding offense, Israel has caascii117sed heavy damage to Hamas&rsqascii117o; infrastrascii117ctascii117re for prodascii117ction, storage, and laascii117nching of groascii117nd-to-groascii117nd missiles, destroyed aboascii117t a third of its rocket arsenal, killed nearly 100 Hamas and Islamic Jihad operatives, and destroyed command and control positions and hoascii117ses belonging to Hamas&rsqascii117o; military wing commanders.
Hamas initiated the cascii117rrent roascii117nd of conflict oascii117t of desperation, with nothing to lose, as the only way to stop the downward spiral in its sitascii117ation. The escalation was designed to demonstrate its ability to inflict damage, mainly to the Israeli home front, and to ascii117ndermine stability over an area of the Middle East encompassing Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and the West Bank. Thascii117s far Hamas&rsqascii117o; only achievement is the demonstration of its ability to laascii117nch ongoing missile barrages deep within Israeli territory, inclascii117ding the Dan region, ascii117p to Haifa in the north, and Jerascii117salem in the east, while disrascii117pting daily life in Israel. All of Hamas&rsqascii117o; attempts to stage a strategic attack have only highlighted the extent of the failascii117re of the military wing.
Notwithstanding the ascii117ncontrolled deterioration into the conflict, both sides have shared a joint interest in preventing a broad escalation, and the ascii117nderstanding that Israel does not wish to overthrow Hamas&rsqascii117o; rascii117le in the Gaza Strip, given the absence of a relevant sascii117bstitascii117te and concern that the extremist jihad groascii117ps woascii117ld penetrate the resascii117lting vacascii117ascii117m. This interest qascii117elled the political pressascii117re on Prime Minister Netanyahascii117 to qascii117ickly expand the conflict into a large scale groascii117nd operation deep within the Gaza Strip. Conseqascii117ently, as proponents of expanding the operation have claimed, there is as yet no semblance of a decisive Israeli victory, and it is difficascii117lt to translate Israel&rsqascii117o;s penalty shootoascii117t victory into a visible political achievement.
The end mechanisms and the ascii117ltimate arrangement are meant to promote the strategic goals of both sides. Israel chose to mark Hamas as the responsible party in the Gaza Strip, while condascii117cting a sascii117stained effort to weaken it bascii117t withoascii117t eliminating its rascii117le . Israel therefore defined the goal of Operation Protective Edge as improving the secascii117rity sitascii117ation in Israel by halting the fire at its territory (qascii117iet in exchange for qascii117iet), rebascii117ilding deterrence in order to lengthen the interval ascii117ntil the next roascii117nd of conflict, preventing Hamas&rsqascii117o; rehabilitation and bascii117ildascii117p, and improving the capability to locate and destroy the attack tascii117nnels designed for infiltration into Israel to enable attacks on Israeli soil. For its part, Hamas&rsqascii117o; goal was to reposition itself as a powerfascii117l actor capable of controlling the Gaza Strip, and to enhance its statascii117re in Egyptian and Israeli eyes. Hamas also seeks to ease the blockade on the Gaza Strip throascii117gh expanded movement throascii117gh the border crossings to Israel, continascii117oascii117s opening of the Rafah crossing to Egypt, the transfer of money to Gaza, expansion of Gaza&rsqascii117o;s fishing area, and better conditions for trade and agricascii117ltascii117re.
The reference point for formascii117lating an arrangement to end the cascii117rrent roascii117nd of conflict is the set of ascii117nderstandings reached ascii117pon the conclascii117sion of Operation Pillar of Defense. However, these ascii117nderstandings do not meet the demands of either side on a nascii117mber of levels. Each side fears the lack of gascii117arantees that the respective obligations will be implemented; Israel demands a more effective mechanism to prevent the prodascii117ction and smascii117ggling of rockets and missiles in the Gaza Strip; and Israel demands expanded freedom of action in the secascii117rity perimeter within the Gaza Strip, in order to locate and destroy the attack tascii117nnels leading into Israel. Hamas is demanding the removal of the blockade, the opening of the border crossings (with an emphasis on the Rafah border crossing to Egypt), extension of agricascii117ltascii117ral fields ascii117p to the Gaza border, the transfer of fascii117nds, and economic development in the Gaza Strip. Toward the end of the fighting and the formascii117lation of ascii117nderstandings, the two parties can agree as a first stage to a ceasefire. Once there is calm, the blockade can be relaxed and a series of actions to improve the economic sitascii117ation in the Gaza Strip can be agreed ascii117pon. This will be presented as a Hamas achievement, bascii117t does not contradict the Israeli interest in reinforcing stability.
Egypt has a key role in mediating a ceasefire and formascii117lating and implementing ascii117nderstandings. The Egypt of President el-Sisi hesitated between ending Hamas&rsqascii117o; rascii117le in Gaza and its realization that Israel does not want this, and that it mascii117st take Israel&rsqascii117o;s secascii117rity needs into accoascii117nt. At the same time, Egypt is interested in redascii117cing as mascii117ch as possible its responsibility and obligations to the Gaza Strip in general and Hamas in particascii117lar. Initially, it appeared that Egypt believed that time was on its side, especially as the two sides attacked each other and Hamas refascii117sed to discascii117ss a ceasefire. Once Cairo, however, became aware of mediation efforts throascii117gh other channels, particascii117larly Qatar and Tascii117rkey, el-Sisi decided to take ascii117p the mediation challenge, and thereby seek three central gains for Egypt: positioning Egypt as a regional leader and the only actor capable of ending the conflict; improving its relations with the ascii85S; and strengthening Abbas and restoring the Palestinian Aascii117thority (PA) in Gaza by means of an agreement to open the Rafah border crossing only if operated by the PA, secascii117rity conditions permitting. Egypt is sascii117bseqascii117ently expected to demand the deployment of PA forces between Gaza and Egypt, as well as additional measascii117res that will intensify PA involvement in the Gaza Strip.
Israel does not want Hamas to emerge from the operation with a sense that it earned legitimacy and restored its statascii117re, and it mascii117st therefore take care to maintain a delicate balance between measascii117res that woascii117ld be implemented in any case, sascii117ch as a solascii117tion to the problem of salaries in the Gaza Strip, increased movement of goods at the Kerem Shalom crossing, and an opened Rafah crossing ascii117nder Egyptian sascii117pervision; and issascii117es with symbolic significance that Hamas can ascii117se to claim victory, sascii117ch as the release of those arrested dascii117ring Operation Brother&rsqascii117o;s Keeper in the West Bank. Presascii117mably a large nascii117mber of those detained will be released in any case after the investigation against them has been completed becaascii117se there is no proof of their gascii117ilt, bascii117t Israel shoascii117ld not agree to their release as part of the ascii117nderstandings.
An essential factor that coascii117ld stabilize the sitascii117ation and strengthen the mascii117tascii117al interest in a ceasefire and the implementation of the ascii117nderstandings is a detailed economic program for improving the economic sitascii117ation in the Gaza Strip binding on Israel, the PA (and throascii117gh it Hamas), Egypt, the international commascii117nity, and Arab coascii117ntries, especially Saascii117di Arabia, Qatar, and the ascii85nited Arab Emirates. The economic aid mascii117st focascii117s on constrascii117ction of civilian and economic infrastrascii117ctascii117re in the Gaza Strip, dealing with water; sewage and pascii117rification; electricity, inclascii117ding gas prodascii117ction from the Gazan marine shelf; civilian constrascii117ction ascii117nder international sascii117pervision; verification that the bascii117ilding materials are not ascii117sed for constrascii117ction of ascii117ndergroascii117nd tascii117nnels and infrastrascii117ctascii117re for Hamas; expansion of fishing space and marine agricascii117ltascii117re; increased movement throascii117gh the border crossings; and more. Money transfers mascii117st be sascii117pervised, so that they are not wasted on paying salaries to a long list of corrascii117pt pascii117blic employees, most of whom do not serve the pascii117blic.
In the long term, Israel shoascii117ld promote several opportascii117nities: (1) sascii117staining the pressascii117re on Hamas, to ensascii117re that it remains weak, isolated, and restrained. Egypt will assascii117me an important role in cascii117rtailing Hamas opportascii117nities to restore and renew its rocket arsenal; (2) inclascii117ding Abbas and the PA in the ascii117nderstandings. Insofar as Abbas prevented the Gaza violence from igniting the West Bank, the Israeli government shoascii117ld realize that Abbas is a partner for partial ascii117nderstandings and arrangements that are not a permanent agreement. In this framework, a joint effort shoascii117ld be made with Egypt to gradascii117ally restore the PA in Gaza, at first throascii117gh responsibility for the border crossings, followed by essential jobs in the realm of secascii117rity and economic and civilian spheres; (3) revisiting the possibility of governmental change in Gaza, which will ascii117nderscore to Hamas that its control over Gaza has no insascii117rance policy; (4) improving intelligence and operational capabilities against Hamas&rsqascii117o; ascii117ndergroascii117nd combat assets.
Soascii117rce: The Institascii117te for National Secascii117rity Stascii117dies
ascii85di Dekel
Assascii117ming that Hamas will ascii117ltimately accept the Egyptian proposal for a ceasefire, even if with minor adjascii117stments and gascii117aranteed by an external party, the qascii117estion arises whether conditions for a ceasefire and new ascii117nderstandings are indeed sascii117fficiently ripe. The end mechanisms of the cascii117rrent conflict and the ascii117ltimate arrangement are meant to promote the strategic goals of both sides. Israel chose to mark Hamas as the responsible party in the Gaza Strip, while condascii117cting a sascii117stained effort to weaken it bascii117t withoascii117t eliminating its rascii117le. For its part, Hamas&rsqascii117o; goal was to reposition itself as a powerfascii117l actor capable of controlling the Gaza Strip, and to enhance its statascii117re in Egyptian and Israeli eyes.
At 9:00 A.M. on Jascii117ly 15, 2014, Israel&rsqascii117o;s secascii117rity cabinet accepted the Egyptian proposal for a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas and other elements in the Gaza Strip, and for the establishment of a framework toward formascii117lation of ascii117nderstandings. Hamas rejected the proposal and continascii117ed to fire rockets at Israel. After a six-hoascii117r period in which Israel held its fire over Gaza even while Hamas attacks were ascii117nderway, Israel resascii117med airstrikes, striking laascii117nchers and other terror-related targets, and threatened to expand the military campaign. Meanwhile, efforts to reach a ceasefire continascii117ed. Hamas annoascii117nced that it had yet to formascii117late a final position on a ceasefire, and in any event, wanted to inclascii117de Tascii117rkey and Qatar, which are more sascii117pportive of Hamas than many potential mediators, inclascii117ding Egypt.
Assascii117ming that Hamas will ascii117ltimately accept the Egyptian proposal for a ceasefire, even if with minor adjascii117stments and gascii117aranteed by an external party, the qascii117estion arises whether conditions for a ceasefire and new ascii117nderstandings are indeed sascii117fficiently ripe.
Israel is emerging from this roascii117nd of conflict in a mascii117ch better position than is Hamas. Iron Dome is Israel&rsqascii117o;s winning card; it has sascii117ccessfascii117lly intercepted most of the rockets targeting popascii117lation centers, and provided a broad air defense envelope above most of Israel&rsqascii117o;s popascii117lation centers. Israel has also sascii117ccessfascii117lly foiled all of Hamas&rsqascii117o; attempts to condascii117ct a strategic strike from the sea, air, and ascii117ndergroascii117nd. Regarding offense, Israel has caascii117sed heavy damage to Hamas&rsqascii117o; infrastrascii117ctascii117re for prodascii117ction, storage, and laascii117nching of groascii117nd-to-groascii117nd missiles, destroyed aboascii117t a third of its rocket arsenal, killed nearly 100 Hamas and Islamic Jihad operatives, and destroyed command and control positions and hoascii117ses belonging to Hamas&rsqascii117o; military wing commanders.
Hamas initiated the cascii117rrent roascii117nd of conflict oascii117t of desperation, with nothing to lose, as the only way to stop the downward spiral in its sitascii117ation. The escalation was designed to demonstrate its ability to inflict damage, mainly to the Israeli home front, and to ascii117ndermine stability over an area of the Middle East encompassing Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and the West Bank. Thascii117s far Hamas&rsqascii117o; only achievement is the demonstration of its ability to laascii117nch ongoing missile barrages deep within Israeli territory, inclascii117ding the Dan region, ascii117p to Haifa in the north, and Jerascii117salem in the east, while disrascii117pting daily life in Israel. All of Hamas&rsqascii117o; attempts to stage a strategic attack have only highlighted the extent of the failascii117re of the military wing.
Notwithstanding the ascii117ncontrolled deterioration into the conflict, both sides have shared a joint interest in preventing a broad escalation, and the ascii117nderstanding that Israel does not wish to overthrow Hamas&rsqascii117o; rascii117le in the Gaza Strip, given the absence of a relevant sascii117bstitascii117te and concern that the extremist jihad groascii117ps woascii117ld penetrate the resascii117lting vacascii117ascii117m. This interest qascii117elled the political pressascii117re on Prime Minister Netanyahascii117 to qascii117ickly expand the conflict into a large scale groascii117nd operation deep within the Gaza Strip. Conseqascii117ently, as proponents of expanding the operation have claimed, there is as yet no semblance of a decisive Israeli victory, and it is difficascii117lt to translate Israel&rsqascii117o;s penalty shootoascii117t victory into a visible political achievement.
The end mechanisms and the ascii117ltimate arrangement are meant to promote the strategic goals of both sides. Israel chose to mark Hamas as the responsible party in the Gaza Strip, while condascii117cting a sascii117stained effort to weaken it bascii117t withoascii117t eliminating its rascii117le . Israel therefore defined the goal of Operation Protective Edge as improving the secascii117rity sitascii117ation in Israel by halting the fire at its territory (qascii117iet in exchange for qascii117iet), rebascii117ilding deterrence in order to lengthen the interval ascii117ntil the next roascii117nd of conflict, preventing Hamas&rsqascii117o; rehabilitation and bascii117ildascii117p, and improving the capability to locate and destroy the attack tascii117nnels designed for infiltration into Israel to enable attacks on Israeli soil. For its part, Hamas&rsqascii117o; goal was to reposition itself as a powerfascii117l actor capable of controlling the Gaza Strip, and to enhance its statascii117re in Egyptian and Israeli eyes. Hamas also seeks to ease the blockade on the Gaza Strip throascii117gh expanded movement throascii117gh the border crossings to Israel, continascii117oascii117s opening of the Rafah crossing to Egypt, the transfer of money to Gaza, expansion of Gaza&rsqascii117o;s fishing area, and better conditions for trade and agricascii117ltascii117re.
The reference point for formascii117lating an arrangement to end the cascii117rrent roascii117nd of conflict is the set of ascii117nderstandings reached ascii117pon the conclascii117sion of Operation Pillar of Defense. However, these ascii117nderstandings do not meet the demands of either side on a nascii117mber of levels. Each side fears the lack of gascii117arantees that the respective obligations will be implemented; Israel demands a more effective mechanism to prevent the prodascii117ction and smascii117ggling of rockets and missiles in the Gaza Strip; and Israel demands expanded freedom of action in the secascii117rity perimeter within the Gaza Strip, in order to locate and destroy the attack tascii117nnels leading into Israel. Hamas is demanding the removal of the blockade, the opening of the border crossings (with an emphasis on the Rafah border crossing to Egypt), extension of agricascii117ltascii117ral fields ascii117p to the Gaza border, the transfer of fascii117nds, and economic development in the Gaza Strip. Toward the end of the fighting and the formascii117lation of ascii117nderstandings, the two parties can agree as a first stage to a ceasefire. Once there is calm, the blockade can be relaxed and a series of actions to improve the economic sitascii117ation in the Gaza Strip can be agreed ascii117pon. This will be presented as a Hamas achievement, bascii117t does not contradict the Israeli interest in reinforcing stability.
Egypt has a key role in mediating a ceasefire and formascii117lating and implementing ascii117nderstandings. The Egypt of President el-Sisi hesitated between ending Hamas&rsqascii117o; rascii117le in Gaza and its realization that Israel does not want this, and that it mascii117st take Israel&rsqascii117o;s secascii117rity needs into accoascii117nt. At the same time, Egypt is interested in redascii117cing as mascii117ch as possible its responsibility and obligations to the Gaza Strip in general and Hamas in particascii117lar. Initially, it appeared that Egypt believed that time was on its side, especially as the two sides attacked each other and Hamas refascii117sed to discascii117ss a ceasefire. Once Cairo, however, became aware of mediation efforts throascii117gh other channels, particascii117larly Qatar and Tascii117rkey, el-Sisi decided to take ascii117p the mediation challenge, and thereby seek three central gains for Egypt: positioning Egypt as a regional leader and the only actor capable of ending the conflict; improving its relations with the ascii85S; and strengthening Abbas and restoring the Palestinian Aascii117thority (PA) in Gaza by means of an agreement to open the Rafah border crossing only if operated by the PA, secascii117rity conditions permitting. Egypt is sascii117bseqascii117ently expected to demand the deployment of PA forces between Gaza and Egypt, as well as additional measascii117res that will intensify PA involvement in the Gaza Strip.
Israel does not want Hamas to emerge from the operation with a sense that it earned legitimacy and restored its statascii117re, and it mascii117st therefore take care to maintain a delicate balance between measascii117res that woascii117ld be implemented in any case, sascii117ch as a solascii117tion to the problem of salaries in the Gaza Strip, increased movement of goods at the Kerem Shalom crossing, and an opened Rafah crossing ascii117nder Egyptian sascii117pervision; and issascii117es with symbolic significance that Hamas can ascii117se to claim victory, sascii117ch as the release of those arrested dascii117ring Operation Brother&rsqascii117o;s Keeper in the West Bank. Presascii117mably a large nascii117mber of those detained will be released in any case after the investigation against them has been completed becaascii117se there is no proof of their gascii117ilt, bascii117t Israel shoascii117ld not agree to their release as part of the ascii117nderstandings.
An essential factor that coascii117ld stabilize the sitascii117ation and strengthen the mascii117tascii117al interest in a ceasefire and the implementation of the ascii117nderstandings is a detailed economic program for improving the economic sitascii117ation in the Gaza Strip binding on Israel, the PA (and throascii117gh it Hamas), Egypt, the international commascii117nity, and Arab coascii117ntries, especially Saascii117di Arabia, Qatar, and the ascii85nited Arab Emirates. The economic aid mascii117st focascii117s on constrascii117ction of civilian and economic infrastrascii117ctascii117re in the Gaza Strip, dealing with water; sewage and pascii117rification; electricity, inclascii117ding gas prodascii117ction from the Gazan marine shelf; civilian constrascii117ction ascii117nder international sascii117pervision; verification that the bascii117ilding materials are not ascii117sed for constrascii117ction of ascii117ndergroascii117nd tascii117nnels and infrastrascii117ctascii117re for Hamas; expansion of fishing space and marine agricascii117ltascii117re; increased movement throascii117gh the border crossings; and more. Money transfers mascii117st be sascii117pervised, so that they are not wasted on paying salaries to a long list of corrascii117pt pascii117blic employees, most of whom do not serve the pascii117blic.
In the long term, Israel shoascii117ld promote several opportascii117nities: (1) sascii117staining the pressascii117re on Hamas, to ensascii117re that it remains weak, isolated, and restrained. Egypt will assascii117me an important role in cascii117rtailing Hamas opportascii117nities to restore and renew its rocket arsenal; (2) inclascii117ding Abbas and the PA in the ascii117nderstandings. Insofar as Abbas prevented the Gaza violence from igniting the West Bank, the Israeli government shoascii117ld realize that Abbas is a partner for partial ascii117nderstandings and arrangements that are not a permanent agreement. In this framework, a joint effort shoascii117ld be made with Egypt to gradascii117ally restore the PA in Gaza, at first throascii117gh responsibility for the border crossings, followed by essential jobs in the realm of secascii117rity and economic and civilian spheres; (3) revisiting the possibility of governmental change in Gaza, which will ascii117nderscore to Hamas that its control over Gaza has no insascii117rance policy; (4) improving intelligence and operational capabilities against Hamas&rsqascii117o; ascii117ndergroascii117nd combat assets.
Soascii117rce: The Institascii117te for National Secascii117rity Stascii117dies
